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ABSTRACT
Issues of tastes and smells are often relegated to an ancillary or minor rank of
importance in the domain of aesthetics, if recognized at all as legitimate objects of aesthetic
inquiry and experience. This essay aims, firstly, to carve out a space of legitimacy for the
aesthetics of tastes, and secondly, to clarify what aesthetic inquiry with regards to tastes
must look like. In order for the above to be decisively established, the following positions
will be argued for: (1) tastes are real, (2) our ordinary or scientific conception of what tastes
are, upon which our reasons for doubting the possibility of successfully and reliably
identifying tastes, is inadequate, (3) normative facts are objective and normative judgments
are cognitive, and (4) aesthetic judgments and the relevant features of aesthetic objects are
so and not otherwise in virtue of the aesthetic domain also being a normative one. This
normativity is dual-aspectual: firstly, the reason(s) or justification for the presence of any
one taste must come from the arrangement of other present tastes. When all justifications
are in harmony, then the parts form a whole, such that to observe that a part is absent
presupposes that it ought to be present. Secondly, the perception of an arrangement of tastes
(or objects) as beautiful consists in the recognition of dignity (and consequentially the
worthiness of the object of judgment as an object of desire for all rational beings) in light
of the harmony noted in the description of the first aspect, and the recognition of this dignity
means that we are disposed to behave in certain ways towards the object in question. The
completion of these tasks will yield a model for all future food criticism.
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PREFACE
The literature on the philosophy of food is, at least at the moment, in its infancy.
While a significant amount of work has been produced regarding the ethics of factory
farming, the injustice of hunger and other forms of food-related poverty, etc., there exists
only a small handful of books, anthologies, and articles that study food as its own
philosophical subject rather than simply applying other philosophical work to it. Much of
the motivation for this project comes from the observation of (and subsequent desire to fill)
this vacancy. However, the general lack of real work in this area may also be due to a lack
of respect; it is traditional for philosophers to view food and drink as base and unworthy
of serious contemplation, for it is assumed that something that serves to fulfill one of our
basic needs cannot at the same time be anything more than just that. Not only shall this
assumption be exposed as mistaken, but hopefully, the philosophical rigor of this work will
help legitimate the topic to the larger community of scholars; after all, it is not enough for
a field to be worthy of our time and effort, but it must also be capable of capturing our
interests. This likely will not happen, given the state of the discipline, unless it can be
shown that the philosophy of food can meet the same standards of analyticity as ethics,
epistemology, and so forth.
My deepest and sincerest gratitude goes to the venerable Dr. Garrett Thomson for
his mentorship throughout this project; without his guidance, I wonder whether I could
have produced a work of even half the quality of the present one. Tremendous intellect and
learning notwithstanding, his compassion, understanding, and insight are a testament, I
believe, to the power of philosophy to make not only intelligent, but good persons.
Lastly, my thanks to S. Roxie Freeman for believing in me.
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INTRODUCTION
0.1: Introduction
This short introduction serves three simple purposes: (1) to briefly address two
related problems in aesthetics that threaten the project’s premature failure, (2) to defend
food criticism as a worthy pursuit generally speaking, and (3) to enumerate what features
of food criticism must be granted in order for it to function successfully. This list of features
will constitute the structure of the following four chapters.

1.0: Early Problems in Aesthetics
In order to make aesthetic claims that are true, or at least not necessarily false,
aesthetic realism must be presupposed. In other words, there must really be aesthetic
qualities, objects, or entities in order to talk about them. Needless to say, the project of food
criticism presupposes aesthetic realism. However, there exist two initial prima facie threats
to aesthetic realism that must be defused in order to show that there is, in fact, room for the
project at hand. First is the “problem of Taste,” and second is the allegedly mysterious
ontology of beauty. Although they can be disentangled, they are certainly connected, for
the first of these two problems has implications for the second (which shall shortly become
clear).
1.1: Taste
“Taste,” in this context, is the capacity (or “faculty”) of making correct aesthetic
judgments. Judgments about the world are objective iff they are true or false independently
of the agent’s mental states. The “problem of Taste” is about whether aesthetic judgments
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can satisfy the demands of objectivity (and therefore qualify to be judgments at all).
Carolyn Korsmeyer writes in her book Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy:
“The so-called problem of Taste, briefly, is this: Aesthetic reactions are
subjective because they constitutively involve pleasure. Yet judgments
about beauty and about the values of art are more important than are mere
reports of subjective states, and so they demand shared standards of
assessment. How can a philosophy of Taste acknowledge the subjectivity
of the aesthetic response and also accommodate the more than subjective
importance of judgments of Taste? How, in other words, can a subjectivist
position avoid relativism and give the object of appreciation its due? These
questions had particular urgency in eighteenth-century debate because of
changing analyses of the ontological status of beauty.”1
Philosophers in the previous century explained the distinction between cognitive mental
states (judgment, belief, observation, calculation, etc.) from non-cognitive ones (attitudes,
desires, wishes, hopes, pleasure/pain, etc.) on the basis of their directions of fit. Cognitive
states like “belief” fit the world, whereas the reverse is true for non-cognitive ones. This
direction of fit allows for truth-functionality. For example, if I believe that there are five
chairs at the table, then when I see that there are in fact only four, I change my belief to
reflect the world as it really is. Conversely, if I wish that there were five chairs rather than
four, then I will make the world conform to my wish by making the necessary changes.
But it would not make sense to say that my wish was either true or false – it is not a
judgment.
The problem of Taste, then, is really the problem of how aesthetic judgments are
even possible in the first place. Because they are judgments, they are supposed to be either
true or false, and yet if aesthetics cannot be separated from subjective, non-truth-functional
“pleasure,” then it seems that the notion of an aesthetic judgments is at best deeply

1
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paradoxical and at worst incoherent and impossible. Thus, we have the famous historical
adage “De gustibus non est disputandum.”2
My response to this problem is twofold. First, I deny that we cannot in principle
separate the notion of an aesthetic judgment from the feeling of pleasure (if not materially,
then logically). In fact, if the objects of aesthetic judgments are to be objective (meaning
that our judgments of them can be, in principle, mistaken), then that requires aesthetic
judgments’ truth-value to be independent of our beliefs or feelings regarding those objects.
Second, the idea that pleasure, enjoyment, or “liking/disliking” is truly subjective (here
meaning not objective) and prior to reasons seems dubious. While it may be true that the
notion of pleasure seems to have an essential phenomenological content that cannot be
reduced to a more fundamental propositional content (and in that way it is natural to think
that it cannot be “mistaken,” for it asserts nothing in the first place), not only are (or at least
so I shall argue in the following chapters) some things are more worthy of our enjoyment
than others, but also we always are capable of enjoying (as opposed to being gratified by)
things for reasons. In this way there is a kind of rationality to enjoyment. In chapter four I
shall argue that our enjoyment of an aesthetic object and rationality (the capacity for
discerning and responding to reasons) are not mutually exclusive, as is often carelessly
assumed; indeed, there is a strong connection between the two. Thus, we shall make heavy
use (especially in chapter four) of the crucial distinction between “enjoyment,” a rational
kind of pleasure that responds to reasons, and “mere gratification,” which is the pleasure
that is caused in us by agreeable objects.

2
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1.2: The Ontology of Beauty
If aesthetic judgments are to be truth-functional, then their objects must be
objective. Aesthetic judgments are of objects (not necessarily a physical object, but an
“object” as a thing that stands in a formal relation to another thing) specifically with regards
to their beauty. The traditional problem of beauty is a semantic one: what it even is. We
struggle to “point to it” in the same way that we would point to the four corners of a
quadrilateral or the location of a car in a parking lot. We also experience great difficulty
when attempting to measure the beauty of an object, yet meanwhile we measure the weight
of a piece of iron ore or the distance between two land masses without a second thought.
This leads some (mistakenly) to skepticism about beauty. Others, such as G.E. Moore,
adopt suspect platonic ontologies in order to explain how judgments of beauty are
possible.3 Both kinds of conclusions are dissatisfactory.
The following famous passage is originally from Ryle’s The Concept of Mind:
“A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a
number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific
departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the
University? I have seen where the members of the colleges live, where the
Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not
yet seen the University in which reside and wort the members of your
University.’ It has not been explained to him that the University is not
another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges,
laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way
in which all that he has seen is organized. When they are seen and when
their coordination is understood, the University has been seen.”4
What Ryle hoped to illustrate in the passage was a category error: a mistaken application
of a predicate to a subject. Although Ryle was concerned with the matter of ontological
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dualism rather than the ontology of beauty, I contend that the two problems are analogous,
or at least similar in relevant ways.
The above conclusions (skepticism, Moore’s Platonism, etc.) regarding the
difficulty of identifying and measuring beauty are dissatisfactory because they result from
a category error. Beauty is not a property in the same way that shape or mass are; it is itself
not a discrete property of an object, separate from all the other properties. Therefore, we
needn’t require an ontology in which “beauty” itself exists as its own isolatable property
(such as Platonism), nor must we assume that we need one in order to be realists about
beauty. This is because “beauty” is a kind of identity, not a substance (and much more shall
be said about this identity in the following chapters).
When we say "that is a chair," we don't say that it has a physical property of
“chairness” (though perhaps Plato would mean to say this), but rather, we tell a story about
its identity and function within a social world. It is semantic rather than purely ontological.5
My point is not that “beauty,” like “chairness,” is simply a matter of functionality, but
rather that the application of the predicate need not presuppose some unique, corresponding
quality or compositional component named “beauty.” Thus, the question of whether
“beauty” exists is the same kind of question as whether “clouds” or “armies” exist, and
thus can be similarly answered in the affirmative.

5

In other words, we should reject the idea that if an object is beautiful, then after we fully
deconstructed it and spread all of the parts on a table, we could pick up the “beautiful part” then reconstruct
the object only without beauty. Thought experiments such as this one commit category errors, as well as
mislead us into adopting extravagant ontologies.

5

2.0: On the Legitimacy of Food Criticism
It has traditionally been concluded that in the absence of an objective, isolatable
quality called “beauty,” aesthetic judgments are thereby actually about the pleasure felt in
the experience of the aesthetic object, such that to judge an object as beautiful requires an
accompanying feeling of pleasure (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Hutcheson, and even Kant
arguably believed this to be true). Some philosophers (notably Mill but to some degree
Plato and Kant as well) were sympathetic to some pleasures (such as those originating from
the exercise of our “mental faculties”), while all others, such as those originating from our
sensory experiences, were effectively condemned as base and neanderthalish.
Elizabeth Telfer notes that because gustation is, after all, a form of sensory
experience (or at least essentially involves it), “some philosophers hold that it is unworthy
to show a particular liking for the pleasures of food. In their view eating may be a good
source of pleasure, but it is not a source of good pleasure.”6 Food is pleasurable, on this
general view, only because of its utility. It is necessary for survival and consequently the
pleasure (or more specifically, gratification) we get from eating is merely primal and
evolutionary rather than being on a par with the pleasures of the intellect. Philosophers
such as Plato (especially in Phaedo) further marginalize bodily pleasures by observing their
tendency to interfere with “higher,” more worthy pursuits, such as achieving true belief
and engaging in moral action.7
The difference in qualitative value of “higher” and “lower” pleasures
notwithstanding, other philosophers have concluded that aesthetic judgments based on
gustation and olfaction are, in fact, not even possible in the first place. The association of
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olfaction and gustation with “animal” gratification (or “agreeableness”) links them with
the raw appetite, perhaps motivating philosophers like Kant to argue that they cannot be
“disinterested” – a necessary condition (Kant claims) for all aesthetic judgment.8
Furthermore, since Kantian aesthetic judgments necessarily involve reference to the form
or structure of their objects and not their hedonic valences, objects of olfaction and
gustation cannot be objects of aesthetic judgment (or at least not in virtue of their smell or
taste) – smells and tastes have no structure.9 Consequently, it might seem like the project
of food criticism is doomed to failure: even if aesthetic judgments are possible, judgments
of tastes and smells do not fulfill the relevant and necessary criteria thereof.
As noted earlier, Kant believes that food gratifies us because it connects to our
interests;10 we crave food because it satisfies our hunger.11 Brillat-Savarin holds that this
overly simplistic view of enjoyment seems to only allow room for gluttony.12
Consequently, he distinguishes “pleasures of eating” from “pleasures of the table.” While
the former requires an appetite and interest, the latter is reflective and disinterested.13 This
reflective state allows for pleasure, but it is the special, rational kind alluded to above,
unlike the subjective, hedonic one assumed by Kant. We take pleasure in good food not
because we actually prefer the taste, but rather, we recognize the taste as being worthy of
such preference. It is enjoyable because it is judged to be good, and not the dogmatic
reverse.

8
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Notice, if you will, the difference between “Jacob enjoys coffee” and “brown sugar gratifies
Jacob.” The “activity” of rational enjoyment and the “passivity” of causal gratification is reflected
syntactically.
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Sweeny 54-55
12
Ibid 57
13
Brillat-Savarin 182
9
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I am willing to grant Kant’s claim that aesthetic judgments make an essential
reference to the object’s structure and not merely any gratification caused by said object
(though they surely have other components as well). However, I, like Emily Brady, think
that the claim that tastes are without structure is simply false, and therefore there is no
reason that food cannot be included in the aesthetic domain in principle.14 Furthermore,
because the tastes of food have this structure, our engagement of food is, at least in this
way, rational (here meaning not animal). Food criticism is a worthy pursuit partly because
this structure can be an objective feature in light of which we enjoy the food. The food may
cause pleasure (gratification in tasting the agreeable), but this does not exhaust the pleasure
of food; at the same time, we enjoy the food because we recognize it to be worthy of our
desire – a judgment rooted in the structure of the food’s tastes. It is a rational pleasure – an
aesthetic pleasure.
Telfer writes:
“[Mill’s] argument that pleasures of food are inferior because they do not
employ man’s distinctive endowment [rationality] is very unsatisfactory. In
the normal human being the pleasures of food do in fact employ man’s
distinctive endowment; they are quite different from those of a pig at a
trough. The human uses his mind to appreciate combinations of flavours
and textures, the suitability of the food for the season, the craftsmanship of
the well-prepared dish, and so on.”15
She goes on to argue that food is worthy of our consideration for reasons beyond its
tastiness or the pleasure it can bring us. She notes eight different ways in which food is
meaningful and valuable for non-pleasure reasons including: religion, food’s role in our

14
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personal identity, functional roles like celebration, expressions of friendship, love, and
family, "exercises in civilization," and artistry.16
To Telfer’s list, I wish to add that food, being an aesthetic object, has a kind of
dignity that we should respect and take seriously.17 This dignity is the basis of the special
rational enjoyment of food in addition to the mere gratification it can cause. This will be
explained in far greater detail in chapter four.

3.0: The Presuppositions of Food Criticism
Food criticism is simply the activity of evaluative food by identifying, comparing,
and explaining its quality (a particular form of beauty). The foundation of food criticism
consists of four pieces that must be clarified and proved to be coherent if food criticism is
to function as intended. Firstly, tastes must be shown to be real and not subjective in order
to make judgments about them. Secondly, we must satisfactorily answer a number of
residual problems with regards to the perception of tastes. Thirdly, it must be demonstrated
that true normative facts are possible, for aesthetic judgments (such as “x is better than y,”
or “x ought to be paired with y whenever z is also present”) have clear normative
components. Fourthly and finally, we must demystify the nature of aesthetic judgments
and aesthetic normativity, including their truth-conditions, psychology, and metaphysical
commitments. Each of the following chapters is assigned to one of these respective pieces.

16

Ibid 37-38
The general notion of “dignity” is often understood to be a special kind of value that is beyond
price. I will argue for a more specific understanding in chapter four.
17

9

CHAPTER ONE: A DEFENSE OF TASTE REALISM
0.1: Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to argue for taste realism. Taste non-realism (which
forms a mutually exclusive dichotomy with taste-realism) rests upon the primarysecondary quality distinction, a representational theory of perception, and an absolute
conception of reality. In refuting the latter three, I will conclude that taste-realism is true
Modus Tollens.
The following is a familiar story: when talking about the “real” world, flavors,
colors, sensations, and moral/aesthetic features are usually left out, or more technically,
eliminated. The rationale behind their elimination is basically that they seem to disappear
when their object is “placed under a microscope.” They are not part of the world absolutely
conceived (which is to say from the perspective of a completed physics), and they are not
intrinsic or true features of the objects of experience independent of appearances. 18 An
adequate account of such features would require an appeal to our idiosyncratic human
perspective rather than the objective world as it is “anyway.”
The above story is a crude illustration of the primary-secondary quality distinction,
or (loosely) following Putnam, the primary-secondary quality thesis.19 I intend to dismantle
this thesis in order to theoretically allow for taste, color, moral, (etc.) realisms. After
providing a more detailed examination of the primary-secondary quality thesis (and the
theory of perception implicit within it), I will raise the following three objections: firstly,
the PSQT relies upon a dysfunctional notion of resemblance. Secondly, the theory of
perception (viz. the representational theory of perception rather than a direct one) that it

18
19
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relies upon is inadequate, for not only does it require that experience is purely passive
(something that Kant shows is impossible), but it also becomes logically untenable when
it is combined with any form of empiricism, strong or weak. Thirdly and finally, the
primary-secondary quality thesis implies an absolute or transcendental conception of
reality which we have every reason to doubt. Certainly there are several other objections
we could raise, but in the interest of time, I will limit this paper to the aforementioned
three.20
The primary-secondary quality thesis was arguably embryonically present in the
philosophy of the ancient Greeks (such as Parmenides and Plato) who found it appropriate
to distinguish between the real world (the world of what-is) and the world of mere
appearances (what-is-not). However, the formal elaboration of this distinction in terms of
primary and secondary qualities is usually credited to John Locke. It is not a mere
metaphysical classification of properties. Rather, because the primary-secondary quality
thesis (which I will henceforth abbreviate as ‘PSQT’) is both an account of the world that
we experience and an explanation of experience, it implicitly contains several additional
and logically reciprocal theses such as a representational theory of perception (henceforth
abbreviated as ‘RepToP’) and a corresponding ontology (an “absolute” or transcendental
one). Consequently, they must be understood together rather than piecemeal.

20
For example, we could criticize the representational theory of perception on the grounds that it
does not adequately allow for the intentionality of perception. We could also criticize the Cartesian
consciousness that merely passive perception suggests on the grounds that it treats our ideas (perceptions)
as essentially private. Wittgenstein shows us that objectivity presupposes publicity in the sense that if we
cannot communicate our experiences, they could not be thought (or had) at all.
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1.0: The PSQT-RepToP-Transcendental Realism Triple-Helix
It is easiest to begin with the RepToP. Held by John Locke and many other
philosophers, it consists of four claims. Firstly, the veil of perception: we can only directly
perceive our own ideas.21 Secondly, the Cartesian consciousness: to have a perception is to
have an idea and vice-versa.22 Furthermore, if an idea is not present in one’s immediate
consciousness, then one cannot be said to have it. Thirdly, the possibility of indirectly or
quasi veridical experience: our ideas (perceptions) resemble or represent the objective
world on the other side of the veil of perception.23 Fourthly, passivity: our ideas
(perceptions) are caused by objects, such that objects imprint themselves upon us rather
than us attending to them; “what [the mind] perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.”24
Clearly, the idea that since our ideas (perceptions) are not the same as their causes
(objects) already suggests the ancient appearance/reality distinction. However, if we can
only perceive our own ideas, knowing whether our experiences are veridical becomes a
hugely problematic (as Descartes shows us). Locke’s PSQT allows him to resist Cartesian
skepticism.
There

are

two

kinds

of

ideas

(perceptions)

that,

while

being

qualitatively/phenomenologically equivalent, are differentiated by their relevant causal
histories. The first are ideas caused by primary qualities, which are the “matter in bodies”
and therefore inseparable from the idea of the object as a whole. 25 Examples of primary
qualities include spatial extension, texture, density – basically physical qualities. Locke

21

Locke II.8.23
Ibid II.1.9, II.9.4
23
Ibid II.8.15
24
Ibid II.9.1
25
Ibid II.8.7
22

12

understands primary qualities to be, essentially, the powers in the object that cause their
corresponding ideas, such that we can never perceive primary qualities directly.26
However, this “veil of perception” is mitigated by the fact that the ideas caused by the
primary qualities of objects actually resemble their causes: the properties of the objects
themselves.27 Our ideas of secondary qualities (such as color, taste, and sound) are not
caused by the objects themselves, and therefore neither resemble their objects28 nor are
intrinsic parts of the object.29 Rather, our ideas of secondary qualities are caused by the cooperation of the causal forces of primary qualities upon us. Thus, the former are fully
(causally) explainable in terms of the latter. For example, the secondary quality color (the
power to cause the idea of color in the perceiver) is caused by and reducible to the primary
qualities of texture and molecular identity.
In order to see that the PSQT presupposes a RepToP, we need only compare the
relevant features of each. The PSQT holds that properties are powers in the object that
cause ideas/perceptions in us, and therefore implicitly affirms the RepToP, which holds
that we can only perceive our own ideas rather than their causes. Furthermore, the PSQT
explains that for our ideas/perceptions to be veridical, they must resemble or represent what
is on the other side of the veil of perception, i.e. their objective causes, and therefore again
presupposes the RepToP.
Contemporary versions of the PSQT held by (for example) Bernard Williams and
J.L. Mackie remain more or less faithful to Locke’s original version. John McDowell
(without endorsing the PSQT) formulates secondary qualities to be properties of objects

26

Ibid II.8.23
Ibid II.8.15
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Ibid II.8.23
29
Ibid II.8.10
27
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which cannot be “adequately understood except as true, if it is true, in virtue of the object’s
disposition to present a certain sort of perceptual appearance: specifically, an appearance
characterizable by using a word for the property itself to say how the object perceptually
appears.”30 Thus, secondary qualities are still understood as powers of the object to imprint
itself upon us, and the ideas or impressions themselves of these secondary qualities are
therefore essentially phenomenal, meaning that they cannot be understood without
reference to what it’s actually like to experience first-hand. Contrariwise, primary qualities
can be understood simply as qualities that do not satisfy the criteria for secondary-qualityness: a primary quality is one that can be understood without reference to any disposition
to cause certain ideas in the perceiver, and therefore an idea of a primary quality would
presumably be not essentially phenomenal.
McDowell agrees with J.L. Mackie that “there would indeed be something weird
(to put it mildly) about the idea of a property that, while retaining the ‘phenomenal’
character of experienced value, was conceived to be part of the world as objectively
characterized,” and thus Mackie’s argument from queerness seems to have something to
it.31 Because of this, “it is natural to think of the special perceptual apparatus involved in
color vision as constituting a special point of view; and a generalization of this line of
thought is what underlies the familiar philosophical thought that a description of the world
as it really is would leave out the secondary qualities,” as they would fail to meet the criteria
of objectivity.32 This is precisely the rationale behind most instantiations of material
eliminativism and scientific reductionism.
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It is therefore easy to see how the PSQT implies an absolute conception of reality.
Firstly, the primary qualities, i.e. the ones that are not essentially phenomenal, are the only
real qualities. Secondly, those real qualities are located on the other side of the veil of
perception; they are totally independent of all perception, which is to say, transcendental.
Primary qualities such as density and spatial extension are knowable only through an
impartial and perspectiveless science, and therefore the real world, or rather, the absolute
one, is intelligible completely in scientific terms. Bernard Williams, who defends the
absolute conception of reality and the objectivity (here meaning the alleged
perspectivelessness) of science, even explicitly claims that any correct conception of realty
would consist only of primary qualities.33
David Hume shows us that when properly combined with empiricism, the RepToP
leads us to a form of skepticism about the external world. Basically, Hume points out that
a consistent application of empiricist principles requires denying that the second part of the
RepToP, that our ideas actually resemble and represent the world, can be meaningfully
asserted. This is because that transcendental world is radically epistemologically
indeterminate. If (i) directly experiencing anything but our own ideas is impossible, and
(ii) we can only meaningfully know what our experience by itself yields, then if there is
any constancy to our perceptions, we cannot make sense of it by appealing to something
beyond perception. To do so would require a special kind of knowledge yielded by neither
sensory nor reflective experience.34 If there is an objective world beyond our immediate
perceptions, then we could only grasp at it through our imagination.35 There is nothing
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beyond experience itself¸ or, if there is, it is unknowable and unthinkable: in Kant’s words,
a meaningless, vacuous concept.
The support for these conclusions come from Hume’s “Fork,” which is developed
in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. All human knowledge belongs to one
and only one of two mutually exclusive epistemological/semantic categories that Hume
calls

“relations

of

ideas”

and

“matters

of

fact”

respectively.

They

are

epistemological/semantic categories because they describe the two ways in which
individual knowledge claims can be true or false. Relations of ideas are true based on “the
mere operations of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the
universe.”36 To think the negation of a true proposition of this first category, therefore, is
to think a contradiction. Meanwhile, matters of fact are defined simply by their not being
relations of ideas, which is to say that if something is true and is a matter of fact, its positive
truth-value is not necessarily entailed by the meanings of the words themselves or their
logical microstructures, but based on what is actually the case in the world. Because “the
contrary of every matter of fact is still possible,” reason alone is insufficient to determine
the truth-value of the knowledge claim, and so we must turn to experience.37

2.0: Critique of the Primary-Secondary Quality Thesis
There are four separate (though equally damaging) critiques of the PSQT and its
implications. The first is McDowell’s who, like Berkeley, attacks the notion of resemblance
which is essential to the RepToP. The second, Kant’s, demonstrates how any account of
perception in which the perceiver takes an essentially passive role does not allow for
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objective experience at all. The third critique is my own (though it is indebted to Kant). I
will argue that the RepToP must be combined with either “consistent empiricism” or
“limited empiricism.” In the case of the former it becomes self-defeating, and in the latter,
superfluous and otiose. The fourth and final critique is also McDowell’s, who attacks the
absolute conception of reality implicitly assumed by the PSQT.
2.1: McDowell and the Notion of Resemblance
Remember that for Locke, the qualities that an object possesses are powers to cause
ideas in us. The distinguishing feature of primary qualities is that their ideas, unlike
secondary qualities, actually resemble their causes (intrinsic properties of objects), and
therefore the veil of perception is partially circumvented. This notion of resemblance,
however, seems highly suspicious to McDowell. Indeed, not only the resemblance between
primary qualities and their ideas, but the possibility of a world being representable through
ideas is what he attacks in his essay “Values and Secondary Qualities.”
McDowell argues that it is erroneous to think of the relationship between qualities
and ideas as analogous to the relationship between the subject of a painting and the
representational content of the painting itself.38 Ideas are essentially phenomenal; the idea
(perception) of shape is simply what it’s like to perceive shape, and the idea of blue is
simply “what it’s like to see blue.” However, “no notion of resemblance could get us from
an essentially experiential state of affairs to the concept of a feature of objects otherwise
than in terms of how its possessors would strike us.”39 If qualities are essentially nonphenomenal and ideas are essentially phenomenal, then it is deeply mysterious how an
essentially non-phenomenal thing could be phenomenally represented at all. Consider this
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sentence: “shape as we see it resembles shape as we do not see it.” The only option left,
McDowell concludes, is to acknowledge that because our ideas of primary and secondary
qualities are phenomenologically “on a par,” we must understand the primary and
secondary qualities themselves in a similarly equal way, viz. that they are only intelligible
in terms of how they are disposed to appear, and therefore would both fail the test for
“objectivity.”40
This comment is similar to a feature of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, specifically
with regards to the absolute, transcendental reality. To say that an idea (of a phenomenon)
can represent and resemble an intrinsic quality beyond the veil of perception (noumenon)
is to assert that the very notion of ‘noumena’ is not semantically vacuous, and that there is
a contentful transcendental reality that that enjoys even a minimal epistemological
connection to our objective experience. However, Kant argues that this is utterly absurd.
Transcendental Idealism partly consists of the rejection of the idea that we can say or think
anything meaningful about an essentially transcendental (or noumenal) reality (in
agreement with Hume on this point). In other words, because the concept of ‘noumena’
suffers from a radical semantic vacuum, we cannot even assert that we cannot know
noumena; to do so would imply that there is something that exists that, yet, we are
necessarily isolated from. However, since this is exactly what is claimed by the PSQT, the
PSQT is faulty.
2.2: Transcendental Idealism
It is Kant’s insight that the possibility of empirical knowledge and the assumption
that we can only directly perceive our own experience (which is a fundamental and
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indispensable assumption of the RepToP) are incompatible; if we accept one, we must
reject the other. In other words, the RepToP implies empirical idealism and transcendental
realism (for not only is the real world the one of essentially non-phenomenal, absolute
things, but the appearances that we can never perceive beyond are false). Kant’s
Transcendental Idealism, being the negation of Transcendental Realism, is simply the
rejection of the claim that empirical idealism is implied by the fact that objects and their
appearances are inseparable and the affirmation of Hume’s conclusion that the
“transcendental” cannot figure meaningfully into our thought; our concept of noumena
suffers from abject semantic poverty, and the transcendental reality is less than a ghost,
necessarily empty and without content. These two conclusions require that we posit that
the world conforms to our experience of it, rather than what had been traditionally assumed,
that our experience conforms to the world. That the phenomenal or “empirical” world is
the real one rather than the noumenal/transcendental one, are implied by the conclusion
that the phenomenal world must have a necessary structure because experience has a
necessary structure, which is made possible by the active role of the understanding in all
possible experience (what Kant calls “spontaneity”). Experience necessarily consists of
active judgments or discriminations and is impossible otherwise. Therefore, we must
dispose of the RepToP entertained by the empiricists and replace it with a direct theory of
perception. However, because the RepToP is logically tethered to the PSQT, a refutation
of one is necessarily fatal for the other. What follows are Kant’s arguments for
Transcendental Idealism in adequate detail.
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2.21: The Metaphysical Deduction
To ask for the pure concepts of the understanding is to ask for the means by which
the understanding functions, for “concepts rest on functions.”41 These functions of the
understanding are judgments, which determine (and indeed are inseparable from) all
representations in relation to their objects.42 Thus, the synthesis of the manifold – the
formation of a representation – is fundamentally an exercise of judgment.43 From the
various logical forms of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, and modality) we can arrive
at the “transcendental structure” of all representations and therefore all experience, viz. the
“categories,”44 for each particular category is the pure concept underlying each particular
kind of logical judgment; for every category there is an analogous judgment and vice-versa.
Thus, that the categories constitute the form of the understanding (judgment) and that the
understanding must judge in certain logical ways are flip sides of the same coin. The
question, then, is how such pure concepts, the “subjective conditions of thought can have
objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge.”45
In order to answer this, Kant must establish an a priori link between the
understanding (judgment), and objective experience (which presupposed by the possibility
of knowledge). He argues, in preparation for the transcendental deduction, that there are
only two ways that a priori concepts could have a necessary connection to objects and their
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representations (which is to say, the experience of the objects). Either (i) objects alone
enable representation and our experience thus conforms to its objects, or (ii) the reverse,
that objects must conform to our experience because experience has a necessary structure,
and anything that did not conform to this structure would not be a possible object of
experience or even of thought. However, if the first were true then the consequent relation
of the categories to the world would merely be a posteriori. Therefore Kant concludes that
the second must be true, that representation enables objects and that objects must conform
to the categories, the form of, or, the necessary conditions of experience.46 Furthermore, if
the object is representable, then it is knowable, and contrariwise if it is not representable,
then it is not knowable.47 Kant concludes that since representation is an act possible only
through the understanding (and therefore of the categories), “the objective validity of the
categories rests… on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them
alone does experience become possible.”48 The specific way this happens, though, has yet
to be explained. This requires a demonstration of how the possibility of being experienced
or thought (the representability) and the objectivity of experience presuppose each other,
or in other words, the inseparability of objects and the possibility of the experience of them,
and thus how the categories are the a priori conditions of all objective experience and the
external world.49
2.22: The Transcendental Deduction (B Version)
“Through the ‘I’, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in
intuition, which is distinct from the ‘I’, can a manifold be given, and only through
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combination in one consciousness can it be thought,” Kant writes.50 Insofar as I am having
an experience, I not only know a priori that it is my experience, but also that my experience
isn’t given by me, but rather, to me, which is to say that my experience is non-subjective
or is of objects.
“The transcendental unity of apperception,” writes Kant, “is that unity through
which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object.”51 The
TUAP can be divided into an objective and a subjective part. Kant calls the objective part
the “original unity,”52 which is the necessary unity of the manifold of intuition given their
reception through the pure intuitions of space and time and hence also the categories, while
the subjective part, the “empirical unity,” is the necessary possibility of accompanying the
manifold of intuition with an ‘I think,’ which is really just to say, the possibility of being
aware that one is having an experience (and therefore that it is theirs). If it was not the case
that the TUAP must be accompanied by the EUAP or its mere possibility, then we would
be faced by the utter absurdity of possible representations (judgments) that could not be
represent to ourselves, i.e. judged or thought.53 The very possibility of this empirical unity,
however, presupposes the conformity of the manifold intuition to the categories (the
original unity), for ‘I think that…’ is a pure apperception and therefore an act of the
understanding (the faculty of judgment through the categories), and the exercise of the
understanding (which is the act of judgment) and the manifold’s unity are materially
equivalent.54
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The categories are applied to what is given through pure intuition through judgment,
which Kant explains as “the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to
the objective unity of apperception.”55 This judgment is not analytic or made after the
experience is had, nor is it the content of the experience itself. It is the form that the
experience takes, expressed through the copula ‘is.’56 What is asserted by the copula ‘is’ is
that the contents of the judgment really “are combined in the object, no matter what the
state of the subject may be.”57 This combination is determinate and thus objective valid,
for “determinate combination[s] of the given manifold” are simply what objects are. 58 In
other words, that an object is a certain way (has determinate properties and relations) is
necessary to the idea of an object, and the same is true for the reverse. Because the original
(objective) unity of apperception is presupposed in the very possibility of the empirical
(subjective) unity of apperception and vice-versa, the TUAP and objective experience are
clearly two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, since all experience is necessarily subject
to the possibility of being accompanied by the pure apperception ‘I think’ (an act of the
understanding), all experience also must necessarily conform to the categories. The
understanding, therefore, makes an invaluable and necessarily indispensable contribution
to our experience, and thus the idea of passive experience (which is entertained by the
empiricists and by the RepToP) is incoherent.
2.3: The Representational Theory of Perception and Epistemology
Earlier I wrote that an insight of Kant’s is that the possibility of empirical
knowledge and the assumption that we can only directly perceive our own experience
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(which is a fundamental assumption of the RepToP) are incompatible such that if we accept
one, we must reject the other. In this third and final critique of the RepToP, I intend to
fortify Kant’s insight by showing that there is really no instance of the RepToP being
viable. This is because one cannot simply adopt such a theory without also adopting a
certain epistemology. I will establish a (provisionally) mutually exclusive dichotomy
between two “epistemologies,” and then show that when combined with the RepToP, they
lead either to advanced skepticism or self-refutation.
Firstly, the dichotomy. I call “consistent empiricism” to be essentially Hume’s
Fork: that all knowledge must be classifiable as either “matters of fact” or “relations of
ideas,” and furthermore, that only “matters of fact” count as objective (here meaning “about
the external world”) and non-trivial. Therefore, all legitimately objective knowledge must
be obtained through sensory experience. By contrast, “limited empiricism” is simply the
negation of consistent empiricism: it is not the case that all knowledge must be either
matters of fact or relations of ideas. While much of our knowledge does come from sense
experience, there is a necessary possibility, even if only theoretical, of objective, non-trivial
knowledge coming from other sources. While Hume’s Fork is basically the opposition
between the synthetic a posteriori (matters of fact) and the analytic a priori (relations of
ideas), we may then understand limited empiricism to be simply the recognition that this is
a false dichotomy, for there is a third, neglected disjunct: the infamous synthetic a priori.
If consistent empiricism is essentially Hume’s Fork, we might analogously understand
limited empiricism as “Kant’s Trident.”
Hume’s work shows that Locke is inconsistent in his empiricism, because
consistent empiricism implies that we are not entitled to speak about what we cannot
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directly experience, and therefore to talk about “primary qualities” as a powers that the
object itself has to cause certain perceptions in us is nonsense. Now, the RepToP itself
simply maintains that we can only experience representations of the world and not the
world itself. Thus, we should be able to see that it is the RepToP in combination with
consistent empiricism that takes us to the terminus of external-world skepticism, as Hume
shows. It’s not simply that secondary qualities seem to have no place in the objective world,
but furthermore, primary qualities are now under attack! Furthermore, we would be right
to question whether there is even anything to the concept of an objective world
semantically, because of just how radical our solipsistic disconnection is.
The RepToP and consistent empiricism are usually concomitant because if we can
only perceive (perception being the having of an idea in one’s head) our own ideas, then
any knowledge would come in the form of an idea. And if there are essentially only two
kinds of ideas, those that represent the world and those that do not, then all knowledge
would have to be of ideas that represent the world, which is simply to affirm some form of
empiricism.
However, there is a second possible combination: the RepToP and limited
empiricism. One question we might ask is whether such a combination also denies the
possibility of objective experience and knowledge. Prima facie, the idea that we can only
perceive our own ideas (which represent the objective world) and Kant’s Trident do not
obviously contradict each other. Nevertheless, I argue that such a combination is
unsustainable, because Kant’s Trident, if consistently entertained, implies the possibility
of certain conclusions (such as Transcendental Idealism) which in turn defeat the RepToP,
and therefore such a combination is self-defeating.
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Under Hume’s Fork, the sentence “my experience is veridical” would be nonsense,
not only because the concept of veridicality is neither analytic a priori nor synthetic a
posteriori, but also because objective experience, which is presupposed in “veridicality,”
is denied through skepticism. If we reject Hume’s Fork and thus accept Kant’s Trident,
then we can make sense of the veridicality of experience, because such a concept would
be synthetic a priori, and the possibility of objective experience is given through the
negation of Hume’s Fork. If I have a veridical experience, then I have an objective
experience. But if I have an objective experience, then that means that I can experience an
object. As demonstrated above, the possibility of experiencing objects requires that we
understand them to be essentially phenomenal as opposed to noumenal. Because the
RepToP treats objects as noumena, a veridical experience could not consist in
representational content. Therefore, through a disjunctive syllogism, veridical experience
must consist in direct experience. In other words, veridicality requires both the negation of
a RepToP and Hume’s Fork, and thus the acceptance of a direct theory of perception and
Kant’s Trident.
2.4: McDowell and the Absolute Conception of Reality
The PSQT implies an absolute conception of reality for two reasons. Firstly, the
primary qualities, i.e. the ones that are not essentially phenomenal, are the only real
qualities. Secondly, those real qualities are located on the other side of the veil of
perception; they are totally independent of all perception, which is to say, transcendental.
Primary qualities such as density and spatial extension are knowable only through an
impartial and perspectiveless science, and therefore the real world, or rather, the absolute
one, is intelligible completely in scientific terms.
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John McDowell attacks the idea entertained by Williams and Mackie that qualities
that cannot be “detached from the idea of an experience of an object’s seeming to have it,”
such as “amusingness.”59 The argument is a familiar one: the idea that objectivity or
realness requires being essentially non-phenomenal (and thus a primary quality)
presupposes an absolute conception of reality. However, we have several reasons to doubt
such a conception, and therefore, we have many reasons to reject the idea that essentially
phenomenal things cannot be objective or real.60
2.41: Two Reasons for Doubt
After studying Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, we should already be suspicious
of the absolute conception of reality, or for that matter, any system that purports to give a
complete explanation of what is relative to our perception in fundamentally non-relative
terms. Nevertheless, McDowell gives us additional reasons for doubting the tenability of
such an explanatory project. According to McDowell, the absolute conception of reality,
which does not allow for the realness of things that we cannot give account for except by
appealing to how they appears to us, “owes what credentials it has, as the frame for all
reflection about our cognitive relations with the world, to its explanatory aspirations.”61
Firstly, the absolute conception promises to be able to causally explain our subjective

McDowell, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World” 116
By ‘objective’ McDowell means ‘absolute-objective.’ This is because McDowell is engaging
Bernard Williams in his own terms. Williams means by ‘objective’ that which is independent of our
perception in the absolute sense (here meaning that a thing can be considered objective if and only if an
account of that thing would never require reference to ourselves qua perceivers, i.e. not essentially
phenomenal), and therefore so does McDowell. I disapprove of McDowell’s seemingly complacent attitude
towards the conflation of the “objective” with the “absolutely objective,” because it fails to explicitly
recognize the false dichotomy: something could be objective and relative as well, i.e. what is essentially
phenomenal. Nevertheless, I think that his analysis is correct. Any problems that this use of the word
“objective” could have in relation to my own project would be superficial pseudo-problems, being based in
mere terminological differences rather than substantively different conclusions.
59

60

61

Ibid 122

27

responses (i.e. appearances). Secondly, the idea of successfully differentiating between
appearance and reality requires a model of science as transparent and perspective-free.
McDowell offers reasons to doubt both of these, and thus further reasons to doubt the
absolute conception of reality.
2.42: Regarding the Former
McDowell writes that “It seems to be an illusion to suppose that such an
understanding [of appearances as being caused by what is real] could still be forthcoming
after we had definitively left behind a view of the world that represents colors as properties
things have. […] in such a position, we would no longer understand what it was that we
were supposed to be explaining.”62 The problem, as Williams notes, is how things are
supposed to be related to something of which they are (supposedly) completely
independent.63 In order to be able to describe subjective responses’ phenomenological
relation to the objective world, one would need to transcend the point of view in which
those subjective responses are exclusively intelligible. Thus, “there is a general difficulty
about the idea that we can firmly detach subjective properties from objects in the world…
while retaining the thought that such properties ‘figure in our experience’, so that we can
regard them as projected on to the world from there.”64
Williams’ proposed solution to this problem is that one can “revert to the third
person or objective point of view,” and thus enable one to say, for example in instances of
pain, not “it hurts” but “it hurts for Jacob.”65 McDowell points out that this suggestion is
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yet insufficient, because such facts are inescapably “intelligible (third-personally, but all
means) only at, or from, a sentient standpoint whose phenomenological character is
sufficiently similar to that of the facts understood.”66 That is to say, we can be thirdpersonal about reporting experiences and their contents/objects while still failing to satisfy
the demands of objectivity in the absolute sense; it is wrong to conflate the two, as Williams
seems to have done.
2.43: Regarding the Latter
For science to promise us a transparent and perspective-free view of the world
(which is, as Williams seems to understand it, the world behind mere appearances), it must
posit a type of “’Archimedean Point’ […] from which a comparison could be set up
between particular representations of the world and the world itself.”67 Such a feature of
science, according to its defenders, is what allows us to decide between competing
explanations of natural phenomena, as well as serving as a kind of “ground zero” in which
all scientific investigation could be securely grounded. But this is to claim, essentially, that
we are able to circumvent the world of mere appearances and arrive at the world of the real
through science because, to speak simply, we already have a foot in the door – something
that seems to beg the question. In order to see that science does or does not successfully
get to the real world, we must already be capable of a pre-scientific transcendental
viewpoint. But this is supposed to be enabled by science, not presupposed by it.
Relatedly, as McDowell notes, the notion of which kinds of scientific methods yield
determinate knowledge about the absolute world “is not prior to, but part of, one’s beliefs
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about what the world is like.”68 And in order to be able to judge different methods of
investigation as more or less effective and successful, which is to say, in order for science
to “survive radical alterations in scientific theory,” the scientific ego must rely upon highly
abstract notions such as simplicity, which themselves only acquire content when placed
into the “context of some specific beliefs.”69 McDowell concludes that there are, therefore,
many reasons to doubt whether science can deliver on its promise to be completely
perspectiveless. This conclusion doesn’t imply that transcendental realism is false per se,
but rather, backs up Kant’s earlier claim that it is empty. If there is a transcendental world,
it is certainly not accessible through science, nor any other related project.
2.44: McDowell’s Conclusion
This amounts not to a refutation of the idea that the strictly speaking non-empirical
features of our experience are not actually independent of us – something that McDowell
readily admits.70 Rather, the point of showing that science could not possibly be
perspective-free is to show that our conflation of the real with what is totally independent
of us is not grounded in a transparent understanding of what actually is “real,” which is to
say, in the world; our designation of the non-independent as unreal relies upon a faultily
drawn line of demarcation. McDowell remarks: “if we can disconnect the notion of the
world […] from that notion of objectivity, then we make it possible to consider different
interpretations of the claim that value is part of the world,” or more generally, that the
essentially phenomenal and the real are not mutually exclusive.71
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We should see that the meaning of “objective” (though not in the way that
McDowell uses it) is similar to Wittgenstein’s sense of “public.” The idea that a language
is public requires that its users can misuse words or be mistaken about things – in other
words, publicity requires defeasibility (the capacity of propositions to be wrong). For
things to be objective, what is minimally required is that we can be mistaken about them,
which presupposes that they are at least non-reducibly supervenient upon us. None of this
obtains for what is strictly subjective. Subjective things are private, and thus we might
question the extent to which we can even speak about them at all. They cannot be measured,
we cannot be mistaken about them, and we cannot have knowledge of them. However, we
can be mistaken about what is relative to us. As Kant showed, for us to perceive the world
at all, it must conform to the necessary features of our experience (for otherwise it could
not even be thinkable). Such a world would clearly, then, be relative and not absolute (for
part of being absolute is to be independent and outside of essential relations). Thus, when
McDowell concludes that we must disconnect the idea of realness from the absolute, he is
also claiming that objectivity is not to be assimilated to what is independent of all relations
and perspectives.

3.0: Conclusion
What has been shown is that any elimination of certain essentially phenomenal or
relative features of the objects of experience from our picture of the objective, real world
that relies upon the PSQT or any of its implications will be faulty. Consequently, it seems
plausible that many of the essentially phenomenal features of experience (including tastes)
are indeed objective and real. However, we must proceed with great care; we cannot
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exclude the possibility of there being different, individual arguments in favor of the
elimination of certain features of the objects of our experience other than the PSQT. For
example, the incredible lack of agreement on matters of taste often tempt us (though, as I
shall argue, mistakenly) into concluding that tastes cannot be real. Furthermore, even if
tastes were real, we could not reasonably expect to reliably and successfully identify them.
These problems, relating to the perception of tastes, will be examined in greater detail in
chapter two.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PERCEPTION OF TASTES
0.1: Introduction
While the previous chapter’s concern was the metaphysical status of tastes, this
chapter is concerned with the perception of taste, particularly how we should not be
discouraged by the fact that consensus is often difficult to establish. The sciences reveal
numerous prima facie perceptual and epistemological problems thereof, such as the
apparent contexualism of taste and the relative weakness and venality of the human tongue.
These are not objections to a possible food-critical theory, but work in tandem to suggest
that even if we had such a theory, its successful application would be practically
impossible. Since we cannot reliably perceive the tastes of food, we couldn’t know whether
our assessments were ever correct or mistaken; we would always be blindly groping about.
I shall answer this challenge by explaining not only how the specific nature of this
ostensible disagreement is perfectly compatible with the veridicality of gustatory
experience, but also by noting how the alleged problem is overstated. The only reason these
observations appear to be problems is that our standard empirical, scientific understanding
of taste is overly-simplistic for reasons that I will elucidate in due time. That being said,
the “alternatives” to the materialist account of the perception of tastes such as
phenomenology and the positing of qualia are not without their own problems. An adequate
account of what tastes are will reveal the purported problems concomitant with the
scientific understanding of tastes to be pseudo-problems, and therefore of no concern to us.
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1.0: The Limitations of Tasting
There are two prima facie problems with the human sense of taste. Firstly, gustatory
perception is prototypical, and therefore cannot reliably identify tastes. “Prototypicality,”
in this context, refers to the fact that the way we describe our experience tends to conform
more to the perceived category of which the object of perception is a member than the
specific or particular aspects of that object. This phenomenon is well documented within
the field of cognitive psychology. Because the relevant “prototype” that guides our
perceptions is (often) contextually determined, it follows that our experiences of tastes are
in general context-sensitive. Thus, it can be very difficult to come to agreements regarding
the object of gustation, or at least non-accidental ones.
The second problem is the weakness of human gustatory ability. While we are very
good at making discriminations (distinguishing between two or more different tastes), we
often cannot successfully identify a taste when it is mixed with multiple other tastes.
Furthermore, the relative strength of individuals’ sense of taste varies both naturally and
genetically. Even if tastes are not subjective, it appears that we simply are not competent
enough to successfully and reliably taste our food, and thus any possible use for food
criticism appears moot.
1.1: The Contextualism of Taste
In a famous experiment, the French scientist Frédéric Brochet artificially changed
the appearance of white wine to resemble red wine using a flavorless, odorless dye. Test
subjects were then asked to taste and describe the wines, not knowing that they had been
mischievously altered. The results of this experiment: “the real red wine was described
from an olfactory and gustative point of view in classical red wine terms. Whereas the
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white wine was described in usual white wine terms during this first experiment.”72 It was
concluded that the gustatory perceptions of the subjects in the experiment were
unknowingly but critically influenced by the color of the object.
Next, Brochet served his test subjects two glasses of wine at an interval of one
week. Although both times the wines were, in fact, identical red Bordeaux superiors, the
labels of the wines at the time of the second serving were switched to trick subjects into
believing they were tasting a wine of far higher quality. The results of this experiment were
perhaps even more damning than the earlier one. A simple analysis of the distribution of
“positive” and “negative” descriptors given by each individual subject per taste of wine
showed that not only was the second wine (the wine that was believe to be of a higher
quality) enjoyed far more than the first, but the subjects also described the second as
possessing far more delicious and excellent flavors than the first. It was observed that the
subjects exhibited the phenomena of “perceptive expectation,” where what is perceived is
simply the subject’s expectations.
While these experiments were conducted specifically with wine rather than another
food, there is little reason to deny that our perception, or at least our gustatory perception,
is not prototypical in other contexts as well. Such a thought is certainly demoralizing, for
it seems to undermine any hope of correctly identifying what we taste. Furthermore, the
issue is not merely epistemological, but perceptual. Brochet’s data show that the subjects
actually had very different experiences of the same object of perception. This leads us
naturally to the question of what we are tasting when we taste anything at all. Are tastes
chemical properties of objects or something different? How can we make sense of their
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objectivity if we suffer from such an apparently unreliable, mendacious, and weak sense
of taste as Brochet observed?
1.2: The Physiology of Taste
A normal human tongue has approximately 5000 taste buds, each containing
roughly 50 to 100 receptor cells, each one with different sensitivities to different chemical
stimulants. In addition to the natural variation of sensitivities to certain tastes between
individual humans, our faculties are also influenced by maturation and genetics. For
example, infants are extremely sensitive to sweetness, but do not appear to be sensitive to
NaCl until several weeks after birth.73 Individuals with two recessive alleles tt are
“nontasters,” while individuals with one dominant Tt are medium tasters (the majority of
humans) and ones with two dominants TT are known as “supertasters.”74 The alleles seem
to determine the quantity and distribution of taste buds on the tongue.75
Taste buds respond to both the identity of the stimulant and the concentration
(represented mentally as intensity). When stimulated, the receptors send electrical impulses
to the brain. In addition to taste, smell (or olfaction) plays an important role in our tastesensations, for the act of chewing and swallowing pushes odorants upward into the nasal
cavity, a process called retronasal olfaction. Orthonasal olfaction (when we smell things
through our nose) also can influence our experience, but to a lesser degree (because it is
physically difficult to smell with our noses the very food we are simultaneously putting in
our mouths). Furthermore, the other nerves in the mouth and esophagus respond to texture,
temperature, etc. also contribute to the final product of the sensation of taste.
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The “basic tastes” account of gustation is that all of our gustatory experience is
composed of atomistic, singular, unique tastes. As Erickson notes, a more specific version
of the basic tastes account has been historically and culturally ubiquitous, viz. that there
are four basic tastes to which everything we taste reduces: sweet, salt, bitter, sour. 76 More
recently, this specific version of the basic tastes account has been challenged by “new
tastes” such as “umami,” as well as the realization that flavors such as “metal” and “fat”
do not seem to be reducible to any combination of the traditional four tastes. However,
even if the new data show that the traditional four basic tastes account is clearly false, that
isn't to say that the “basic tastes” account generally is wrong, for there could simply be
more basic tastes than we have historically thought. The only thing that must be true in
order for the basic tastes account to be technically correct is for there to be a finite set of
tastes, and for the object(s) of every possible gustatory experience to be composed of at
least one member of this finite set.
While the problem in the above paragraph was in regards to quantity of qualitatively
discrete tastes, a related problem regards the specific the biomechanics of taste broadly
speaking. The work of German scientist D.P. Hanig is largely responsible for the idea
(which has been taken as given by many researchers thereafter) that there are only four
basic tastes, because a map of the chemical receptors of the tongue reveal there to be four
different (albeit overlapping) organizational zones (front, back, left side, right side), each
being statistically more responsive to certain tastes rather than others. 77 To wit, the front
tends to be more sensitive to sweetness, the back to bitterness, and the left and right sides
to both saltiness and sourness. However, it has since been well-documented that our taste-
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buds have multiple sensitivities (or are “broadly-tuned”), which is to say that it is
theoretically possible that someone could have all but one taste bud removed and still be
able to experience more than one unique taste.78 The broad-tuning of individual taste-buds
suggests that Hanig’s picture of the tongue is mistaken, for one needn’t have a “bitter
molecule” on the back of the tongue in order to taste the bitterness.
1.3: The Neurology of Taste
Given the broad-tuning of human taste-buds, as well as the molecular complexity
of what we eat, it would seem intuitive that we would be consciously perceiving a huge
variety of different yet simultaneous objects when we taste our food. Furthermore, we don't
just perceive tastes alone, but we also are aware of the smell, the texture, the temperature,
and many other of food’s sensible features. The brain is not so easily overwhelmed by the
quantity and complexity of this chemosensory stimulation because of a function known as
“higher-order processing,” during which the brain effectively “filters” input from the
various nerves in our bodies. Input from our taste-buds, the olfactory bulb, touch and vision
data, and hedonic valence or agreeableness (thought to be supplied by the amygdala) are
brought together in the brain’s orbitofrontal cortex and synthesized into a highly
sophisticated representation of the sensory world.79 This is made possible by the capability
of the orbitofrontal neurons to process cross-modally, or rather, respond to inputs of
different sensory origins. Additionally, possibly due to the link between hedonic valence
and association/memory, the amount of pleasure we experience when tasting an object
varies. This could allow us to account for the variety of preferred tastes across cultures and
populations, viz. that preferences are environmentally and culturally conditioned.
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Although we are sensitive to countless unique chemical stimuli, it is notably
difficult for us to be able to successfully identify more than three or four unique elements
of any given food-object.80 This may start to give us reason to doubt whether we can have
veridical experiences of food-objects at all, though it is important to note that while humans
tend to be lousy at identifying particular chemical stimulants (especially in complex foodobjects, which constitute the vast majority of gustatory experiences in ordinary life), it has
been observed that we tend to be quite good at making simple discriminations, meaning
that we can usually qualitatively compare different gustatory experiences and infer whether
particular objects of gustatory experience were similar, different, identical, etc.81
Halpern notes that the corollary of the idea that we have only four (or some finite
number) kinds of receptors (each kind being finely tuned to one specific taste) is that there
exists a corresponding and similarly finely-tuned neuron (or neuron kind) responsible for
processing the relevant inputs.82 This neurological account of tasting is the “labeled-line”
account. An alternative to the labeled-line account is “across-fiber patterning,” which is
extensively defended by Erickson. Essentially, rather than there being a finite number of
neuron-kinds that handle exclusively one unique kind of taste, individual neurons are
capable of processing more than one unique kind of sensory input from the taste receptors
in the mouth.
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2.0: Critique of the Scientific Conception of Taste
The general picture of gustation drawn by the sciences is misleading in two ways.
Firstly, the contextualism documented by Brochet and Morrot only has the problematic
implications that it does because the intentionality of perception is ignored. Secondly,
perhaps due (in part) to the sciences’ empiricist heritage, the perception of tastes is
construed as “atomistic,” wherein we are confronted with discrete and non-reducible
“simple” tastes that we must identify, similar to the late-empiricist picture of experience as
consisting in the passive subject’s bombardment by units of sense-data, as if experiencing
the world were like viewing a pointalist painting. Furthermore, tastes themselves are
typically assimilated to kinds of molecules, such that tastes, properly understood, fall
within the jurisdiction of physics. Important to note, however, is that these criticisms do
not target the sciences themselves, but rather how those observations and data are
interpreted.
2.1: Intentionality
Intentionality is has traditionally been defined as a unique feature of certain mental
states (such as perceiving, wishing, believing, and any others insofar as they have
directions of fit), namely that they are about something. More specifically, intentional
mental states represent their conditions of satisfaction.83 The conditions of satisfaction are
called the content of that intentional mental state, while whatever it is in virtue of which
that those conditions are either satisfied or dissatisfied is the intentional object; I cannot
see without seeing something as being a certain way, nor can I merely believe without
believing that something is the case. Of course, not all mental states are intentional; clinical

83

Searle 13

40

depression, for example, does not take an object. Others, such as moods, needn’t
necessarily be intentional, for it is possible for someone to simply feel happy or anxious
for no particular reason. However, all of the mental states that were are presently concerned
with surely are intentional.
Intentionality allows us to account for the veridicality of experience. Perceiving a
yellow car and having a hallucination of a yellow car can be phenomenologically identical
in the sense that both experiences have the same content. However, we would surely want
to say that the former was veridical and the latter was not. Since the intentional content of
perception is a representation of the success-conditions of the corresponding mental state,
to have an intentional mental state is tantamount to knowing the conditions under which
that mental state would or would not be veridical or correct.84 Thus, my experience that
there is a yellow taxi cab is veridical iff there really is a yellow taxi cab, and it is a
“hallucination” otherwise.
We must be careful, however, not to conflate the mental state itself with its
intentional content. If I were to say that “I believe that David Hume lives in a red house,”
I am (1) reporting that my mental state is one of believing, and (2) stating that the content
of that belief is that David Hume lives in a red house. Searle’s helpful notation for this is
“Belief(that ‘p’).”85 The ‘p’ is in inverted commas because it is the content of the belief,
rather than the object, and we must be careful not to confuse the two. Reifying the content
of intentional mental states would mean that when I have a belief, for example, I actually
have an object in my mind.
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If we understand mental events or contents (such as ideas, beliefs, experiences, etc.)
to be objects, then we affirm the Cartesian conception of consciousness and a
corresponding representational theory of perception that I refuted in chapter one. However,
the arguments deployed in that chapter do not exhaustively describe how deeply flawed the
Cartesian view of consciousness is. If all mental “things” are objects, then we cannot
account for the possibility of experiencing the same object in different ways, nor, indeed,
phenomenal experience at all; in fact, we require a content/object distinction in order to do
this. Under the representational theory of perception, persons having objective experiences
takes the traditional form of ‘a R b’ where a and b stand for objects, and ‘R’ is a relation
between them. For example, “Jacob sees the jar of olives.” However, what cannot be
expressed is something like “Jacob sees that the olives are old and greenish.” The reason
that a R b cannot make sense of this is that “that the olives are old and greenish” is not an
object, and therefore does not have properties which could cause the idea of “oldness” or
“greenish” in our minds. At best, they would be properties of objects, but then they would
be secondary and consequently eliminated by scientific reductionism. We should
understand intentionality and the content/object distinction as being a kind of antidote to
this, for not only does it allow us to make sense of sentences like “Jacob b’s that ‘p’,” but
it also allows the content of our experience to escape scientific reductionism or
eliminativism, for it is fundamentally distinct from the object of experience.
Since the mental state, the intentional content, and the object of perception are all
distinct, we can have different perceptual experiences of the same object; we can see it in
different ways, or notice some aspects but not others. Searle’s example is Wittgenstein’s
duck-rabbit. We can expect either a duck or a rabbit and therefore represent in our mental
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states different success-conditions. Consequentially, we can explain why we experience
the same object in different ways (as a duck or as a rabbit) by appealing to the different
success-conditions of the intentionality of our perceptions, even though the object itself
does not change.86
Contextualism could be interpreted as suggesting that we do not really perceive
objects as they are, but rather, as we expect them to be. In other words, contextualism
motivates the empiricist thesis that we can only directly perceive our own ideas. This
interpretation is mistaken because it fails to distinguish the content of perception from the
object of perception; the fact that we cannot perceive an object except as being in a certain
way does not imply that we cannot directly perceive said object.
2.11: Intentionality and the Aspectual Nature of Perception
Kant shows us that we must understand the structure of experience to be judgment.
If gustation, i.e. the perception of tastes, is a form of experience, then that means its
structure must also be that of judgment. Gustation, being therefore intentional, is also
cognitive, and its intentional content allows for veridicality, which is precisely what is
minimally required for objectivity of its intentional objects. Take, for example, the sentence
“I taste lemon.” We have just reported a judgment of a taste, which we must not confuse
with the actual taste of lemon itself. Such a confusion would be a conflation of the
intentional content with then intentional object.
Understanding gustation to be an intentional judgment allows us to make sense of
Brochet’s troubling observations that two people can taste the same wine and have two
very different experiences of it, or judge it in competing ways under different tasting
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circumstances. When we expect or attend to different aspects of the object of our
experience, we are simply having a normal perception with a different specific intentional
content. The fact that people report different gustatory features of food-objects upon tasting
does not imply that tasting is subjective (meaning that the things they are perceiving are
not actually in the object at all, but rather, in their heads), but rather, the apparent
disagreement is only superficial; it is perfectly consistent with the inescapable
intentionality of perception that we can have perceptions with varying content of the same
object of perception, because intentionality leads us necessarily attend to some aspects of
the object of perception and not others. Consider the possibility that two people in
sufficiently similar perceptual conditions view the same yellow taxi cab, only to give two
different reports. One says “I see that it is a yellow car with a checkered stripe,” while the
other says “I see that it is an old taxi with mud caked into the wheel wells.” While the
context of the perception may affect which aspects we attend to, that is by itself insufficient
to demonstrate that those aspects we report are illusory or somehow less real.
2.2: Against Physicalism
Taste physicalism (not to be confused with taste atomism, the claim that there exist
a finite number of discrete tastes that we experience in certain combinations) is simply the
thesis, often entertained by scientists, that tastes are physical things. For example,
“bitterness” is the presence of 6-N-Propylthiouracil. Allow me to dissect this thesis in a
Wittgenstinian style.
A tube of seasoning spread from Laura Santtini is named “Taste #5 Umami Paste.”
A caption under the brand label claims that umami is the scientifically confirmed fifth taste.
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Suppose flavors are molecules. There are only five flavors, according to the
sciences. Are there also only five molecules?
Some objects are said to have no taste. For example, water (H2O) is flavorless. Why
do some molecules have a taste, while others do not? Or rather, why are some tastes, while
others are not?
How does the soup taste salty? Because of the presence of NaCl. But how does
NaCl taste salty? In a sense, assimilating taste to molecules does not solve anything – it
only creates homunculi problems of the following question: “how do things have tastes at
all?”
If tastes are molecules, then the following sentence fragment is incoherent: “the
taste of NaCl.” NaCl does not taste of salt – NaCl is the taste of salt! But then, surely the
object itself, a grain of salt, is not identical with what it’s like to touch a piece of salt to
your tongue. For the same reasons, to have an idea of a table is not to literally have a table
inside of your head; the seeing of a house does not consist in tiny houses dutifully entering
your eyeball and deftly flying straight to your brain.
A taste does not taste like something else, and the taste itself cannot (or rather,
should not) be spoken about in terms of tastes. In other words, if tastes are molecules, then
the taste of salt cannot be distinguished from salt itself. Thus the following absurdity arises:
the sentence “what does salt taste like” is equivalent to “what does the taste of the taste of
salt taste like?”
Perhaps we’re wrong to say that some objects are without tastes. Suppose all
objects have a taste. But then, how do we account for the taste of iron if iron is neither salt,
sugar, bitter, sour, umami, etc.?
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It does not matter whether there are four tastes, five tastes, or five-thousand tastes.
It does not matter if there is more than one molecule that corresponds to “salty.” If tastes
are assimilated to physical things, then all of these problems will still arise. The rejection
of taste physicalism means that tastes per se do not fall under the jurisdiction of the
sciences.
2.3: Holistic Perception
The “holism of perception” is actually two different though related points: firstly
and most straightforwardly, “tastes” are not discrete molecules, as is typically presumed
by the sciences. Salt, sweet, bitter, etc. are not tastes, but flavorants. Tastes are not only far
more complex – the taste of peanut-butter, the taste of Aperol, etc. – but the taste of any
particular food is not necessarily reducible to some combination of basic flavorants like
salty and sweet. We taste holistically (meaning that what we taste is not just a matrix of
salty, sweet, bitter, and sour, but rather, a taste is itself a unity of multiple different aspects
of an object including its temperature, mouthfeel, etc.) because our experience must consist
of a synthetic unity. Secondly, when we perceive objects, we tend to perceive them
aspectually – our attention is directed to some aspects but not others – and this is only
possible if our experience is a synthetic unity. This second point requires more explanation
than the first.
That our experience is necessarily a synthetic unity (from which the above two
points directly follows), meaning that our experience does not consist of a matrix of
individual sense-data, but is a fluid whole, is demonstrated by Kant (see chapter one). This
unity can be dissolved, but only through a post-experiential act of analysis. To analyze an
experience means to examine its individual aspects, or to decompose its phenomenal
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features. It goes without saying that because analysis is of an experience, we require a
synthetic unity to do so. This means that when we taste an object, we taste it (judge it to be
a certain way) in a holistic way; we do not taste individual units of sense-data such as
sweetness or bitterness (for this would be a pointalist or atomistic form of experience such
as the empiricists maintained).
Our expectations focus our attention and influence what we consciously experience
for two reasons. The first is that to expect something or to focus ones attention on
something is, essentially, to look for it specifically, which is an act of analysis rather than
synthesis. To expect or attend to something means to bring that particular aspect of the
content of one’s perception into the forefront in the EUAP (the conscious awareness that
one is having an experience), which we then mistakenly interpret as constituting a different
experience entirely rather than a different aspect of the experience. However, as Kant
demonstrated, the experience itself, a synthetic unity, is enabled by and realized in the
TUAP and not the EUAP. When I describe my experience, the EUAP may dissolve the
synthetic unity into its parts through analysis, which may then be reported. Suppose a group
of four sommeliers taste the same bottle of wine, and then describe it in four different ways.
We cannot conclude, all other things being equal, that they had fundamentally different
qualitative experiences (i.e. the synthetic unities were non-identical), but rather, we can
easily account for such variation, for the discrepancies occur in the analysis and not in the
synthesis.
Secondly, expecting and attending are intentional mental states which represent
certain conditions of satisfaction, such as “that there is pear and not kiwi,” or “that the
overall taste feels symmetrical and not lopsided.” Intentionality is an inescapable feature
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of all perception, and therefore we cannot perceive food-objects “impartially,” meaning
that we cannot simply experience the object without attending to some particular aspect of
the content of our experience. Thus, we should be able to see that the “challenge” of
prototypicality, viz. that we seem to only be able to view objects impartially and relative
to the context of perception, is deeply confused. Indeed, our expectations influence the
content of our experience, but only such that we attend to different aspects of the object.
Furthermore, even if two wine-tasters really do report contradictory experiences, the
content/object distinction shows us that it must be the case that one or both are mistaken.

3.0: The Phenomenology of Taste
So far I have argued for the position that tastes are not physical in the sense that
what we the object of our gustatory experience cannot be reduced to a finite number of
simple molecules in various ratios and combinations. In §2.2, I noted that not only the
language we use to talk about tastes – the taste of rosemary, for example – but also the
structure that our experience must have, entreats us to resist thinking that tastes can be
deconstructed into individual physical units such as salt or sugar. Furthermore, the picture
of gustatory perception that is implied by understanding tastes to be physical is passive,
causal, and “pointalist.” Such an account of perception, whether gustatory or otherwise,
was rejected in the previous chapter. Consequently, any purely physicalist account of what
a taste is will be incomplete – as Thomas Nagel contends, the subjective, intensional,87 or

87

A sentence is extensional iff any of its terms could be replaced by a co-referential term salva
veritate. An intensional sentence is one that fails the criterion for extensionality.

48

essentially phenomenal aspects of our experience systematically refuse to be reduced to
the extensional and physicalist language of science.88
3.1: Qualia
We may be tempted into thinking that tastes are non-physical, then tastes are qualia,
i.e. intrinsic and essentially phenomenal “properties” of experience – the “what it’s likeness.” Furthermore, the work done in the previous chapter may also support this
conclusion, for there are no ontological problems with the reality of essentially phenomenal
things. However, we must nevertheless resist this temptation.
It is wrong to assume that we must posit a unique phenomenal property (a quale)
in order to make sense of the way in which we experience things. Surely experience has a
subjective dimension – a “feel” that cannot be expressed except by a functionalist reference
– but this can be done without positing qualia. For example, we can describe the subjective
nature of the taste of peanut butter simply by saying “what one tastes when they eat peanut
butter.” Even if the “qualia hypothesis” were necessary to explain this subjective nature of
experience, it would still be deeply flawed in the following ways.
Daniel Dennett argues decisively in his paper “Quining Qualia” that the very idea
of a quale is incoherent. Qualia have four fundamental features: they are (1) ineffable, (2)
intrinsic to our experience, (3) essentially private, and (4) immanent or introspectively
apprehensible. The problem with qualia, generally speaking, is that because they are
supposed to be essentially private, we could not be mistaken about them.89 Furthermore,
because of this infalliblism, we cannot even be sure whether the quale that we taste when
we take our second sip of coffee is the same as the quale that we experienced with the
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first!90 If qualia could change without even the mere possibility of knowing, then they could
not figure meaningfully into experience. They not only escape all description, but also are
not possible objects of knowledge.91
3.2: What Tastes Are
Tastes are not physical properties, nor are they properties of a different sort of
substance (such as “the mental” in a Cartesian sense). There is clearly something
essentially phenomenal about them, for we cannot acquire the concept of any given taste
except by experience. However, they are also objective, for clearly we can be mistaken in
our attempts to identify certain tastes. Tastes must therefore be relational properties, for
no other kind of property could accommodate all of these features. If tastes are relational,
then it is meaningless to speak of tastes without also speaking of tasters in the same way
that the notion of an unthinkable idea is absurd. A taste is, fundamentally, an objective
appearance.
This understanding of tastes allows us to account for the relationship between the
physical object and the content of our gustatory experience far better than any physicalist
or mentalistic conception. For if tastes were merely physical, which is to say, independent
of all appearances, then they could not actually be perceived. Yet if tastes were purely
mental, then taste and material constitution would have to be independent; we could not
say, for example, that the soup tastes salty because somebody added too much salt.
Furthermore, the idea that tastes are strictly mental suggests the same Cartesian view of
consciousness discussed briefly in the previous chapter, because to taste something is
simply to have an idea and nothing more; we already have good reason to dismiss such a
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possibility. Meanwhile, if tastes are appearances, then they must be the way in which
certain physical properties appear to us. Thus, we can balance the physical constitution of
the object with the non-physical, subjective feel of the experience.
3.3: Levels of Description
I shall motivate the idea that tastes are objective appearances (and thus relative to
yet not exclusively determined by the object’s material constitution) by making an
analogical appeal to levels of description in causal accounts of non-physical phenomena. I
contend that if one accepts that there is nothing problematic about the objectivity of the
phenomena named in the following examples, then one must also accept the legitimacy of
the account of tastes as being appearances.
Firstly, let us distinguish between causal relations and causal explanations. Causal
relations are forces between objects that are “indifferent to how we describe them.”92 They
either do or do not obtain; x either does or does not cause y. Meanwhile, causal explanations
are descriptions that attempt to render intelligible some succession of events. Davidson
contends that an explanation renders a succession of events intelligible iff the effect can be
“clearly and distinctly perceived through the [description of] the cause.” 93 This means,
firstly, that while it may be true that everything has some cause, “it makes no sense to speak
of explaining or understanding the existence or modification of anything except under one
or another system of description.”94 Secondly, explanations can be better or worse (the
criteria thereof are explored in the following paragraph). Thirdly, Davidson holds that there
is more than one conceptual system under which events are describable, such as “mental”
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and “physical.”95 “The ideal of a comprehensive vocabulary in which complete
explanations could in theory be given of any event,” he writes, “does not rule out the
possibility of another, irreducibly different vocabulary in which alternative explanations of
the very same events could be produced.”96
In order to make greater sense of this idea, we might compare Davidson’s work
with Searle’s. Different “conceptual systems” for Davidson are roughly the same as
Searle’s levels of description. We might then think that for an explanation to be best, it
must engage the relevant causal properties which belong to either one system or another
(or are found in one or another level of description); the relevant causal properties depend
on whichever level of description under which the effect in question is actually described
and explained.97 Consider the action of raising one’s hand. This action has a cause, but a
mere identification of the cause may not be enough to render the event intelligible. In this
case, it is because raising one’s arm is an intentional action with a corresponding intentional
mental state. If we were to simply tell a story about the mechanical interactions of muscle
tissue, the nervous system, and neurons in the brain, we could not, as Davidson says, clearly
and distinctly perceive the effect. Clearly, to understand the event as an intentional action
is to classify it under a certain conceptual system or level of description; if we appeal to an
explanation at a different level of description, i.e. a molecular or physiological one, then
we are giving an inadequate account as the causal properties appealed to are irrelevant.
This is essentially the same analysis that Davidson offers of Spinoza, who writes in his
Ethics that “the Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot
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determine the Body to motion.”98 “We should take this to mean,” Davidson concludes,
“that we cannot infer from a cause described in physical terms that a specific mental event
will ensue.”99 An adequate account of raising one’s hand, then, must appeal to causal
conditions from the same level of description (for otherwise they would be irrelevant). We
might, then, say something about the reasons I had for acting, my belief that raising my
hand would accomplish some goal, etc.
For further clarification, Searle gives us the following two examples:100

The vertical arrows indicate realization such that at T1 the rise in temperature is realized in
the movement of individual electrons between electrodes. Meanwhile, the horizontal
arrows indicate causation, such that the rise in temperature at T1 is the cause of the
explosion in the cylinder at T2. T1 and T2 comprise one and the same event, yet this event
can be described at different levels, as indicated by the vertical arrows.101 Because this first
example seems more or less unobjectionable, Searle claims that there’s no reason that we
should deny the second example:
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Building off of Davidson and Searle, I assert that tastes have a supervenient
relationship to the physical properties of their objects. However, they are also essentially
phenomenal, for they are not reducible to those physical properties. The only way to know
a taste is to actually taste it (though perhaps we can imagine tastes by comparing them to
others, such as when we describe the taste of grapefruit as “bitter and citrusy”).
Furthermore, given the intentionality of perception, we can experience the taste(s) of
objects in different ways, as well as attend to certain aspects of the taste(s) and not others.

4.0: Conclusion
I have attempted to show that the conventional scientific understanding of tastes
and tasting is inadequate, and that therefore the problems that arise from it are moot. I have
also argued that despite the falsity of overly-physicalistic accounts of taste, there are also
accounts that do not give the physical enough credit. Given the intentionality and aspectual
nature of perception, as well as the status of tastes as objective appearances that supervene
upon a number of physical properties, we must acknowledge that the nature and perception
of tastes is too complex to be challenged successfully by prima facie disagreement of
tasters. Despite what sometimes feels to be insurmountable difficulty, we should feel
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confident in our capacities to taste accurately, and therefore in the possibility of the success
of the project of food-criticism.
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CHAPTER THREE: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENTS IN GENERAL
0.1: Introduction
In this chapter I shall defend the thesis that some tastes or combinations of tastes
really may be better than others. This thesis is derivative of a more fundamental one, which
is that normativity (whether conceived of as value, reasons, goodness, fittingness, etc.) is
objective (and thus normative claims may be cognitive). Many if not all of the arguments
against the objectivity of normative facts and the cognitivity of normative judgments rely
upon at least two premises: firstly, there is a strict dichotomy between evaluative and nonevaluative properties, and secondly, anything that is essentially relational, as opposed to
being part of the world anyway, is neither objective nor real.102 As we saw in chapter one
with Kant and McDowell, objectivity does not require the absolute, contra Williams.
Furthermore, the very idea of an absolute world is untenable, or at the very least empty and
otiose. I shall not revisit here the arguments for rejecting the second premise above, for this
was already accomplished. Rather, I will undermine the first premise by appealing to
instances of cognitive yet rationally evaluative concepts, which Williams terms “thick.”103
If it can be demonstrated that thick evaluative concepts are indeed cognitive, while not
being “factorable” into descriptive and prescriptive components as prescriptivism insists,
then we will have accomplished our goal. If the fact-value dichotomy is false, then this
means at least two things: firstly, it is false that mere or so-called “neutral” facts have a
monopoly on what is real (or in other words, values can be objective and real). Secondly,
there is nothing precluding facts from also being values or vice versa – in fact, to even use
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such language in which the two are distinguished is misleading. I will conclude with a
discussion of how we are to understand value if it is to be objective while simultaneously
independent of the interests and desires that we have at any given time.

1.0: History
Values cannot be facts, and facts cannot be values; this is the claim of those who
subscribe to the fact-value dichotomy. It is not merely a categorical logical assertion that
the set of what is real and the set of values are mutually exclusive, but it is furthermore the
claim that facts cannot motivate us to action. This will become important later.
The history of the fact-value dichotomy begins with David Hume. Implicit in his
Treatise of Human Nature is the load-bearing semantic dichotomy between truthfunctional and non-truth-functional sentences. Truth-functional sentences are those that are
either “relations of ideas” or “matters of fact.” Non-truth-functional sentences are ones that
are mere expressions of sentiment or “passions.” Hume begins Book III by asking whence
our morality is derived or determined. If morality were determined by relations of ideas,
argues Hume, then morality couldn’t motivate us. However, morality clearly can motivate
us, therefore it cannot be determined by relations between ideas. The justification for the
first premise comes from Hume’s belief that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of
the passions,” and thus is “utterly impotent” motivationally speaking.104 Hume moves on
to deny the possibility of morality being determined by matters of fact. Rather than arguing,
he challenges us to identify a virtuous or vicious event and “point” to the precise location
of virtue or vice; we cannot. We can only identify passions, volitions, sentiments, etc., and
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even then only when we turn our reflection inward.105 In other words, we project the values
(or normative properties in general) that we think we see.
Having argued for the foreclosure of the possibility of value-claims being truthfunctional, Hume concludes that values must be mere expressions of passion or sentiment
– a fundamentally non-cognitivist position. This is because (1) motivational mental states
are essentially sentimental rather than truth-functional (as demonstrated above), and (2) the
set of qualities that are real or objective are supposed to be exhaustively captured by the
semantic dichotomy between relations between ideas and matters of fact, of which
sentiments are neither. In other words, virtue and vice, like color, sound, etc., are mere
ideas in the mind rather than qualities in objects.106 Hammering one final nail into the
coffin, Hume then explains that all that words such as “virtuous” or “vicious” do is express
our attitudes toward something, such that “goodness is determined merely by pleasure.”107
The idea that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is a function of the implicit
dichotomy between truth-functional and non-truth-functional sentences, which maps
perfectly on to the [(relations between ideas/matters of fact)/sentiments] dichotomy. Since
the two disjuncts are distinguished by truth-functionality, the relation between them must
necessarily be one of logical indeterminacy – one cannot possible imply another. This
directly denies the possibility of there being objective value, because on such a view, the
objective and the valuable are logically exclusive categories. Therefore the fact-value
dichotomy must be destroyed if we are to have the possibility, even if only theoretical, of
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having objective values, and thus of combinations of flavors that are objectively better or
worse than others.

2.0: Critique of the Fact-Value Dichotomy
The fact-value (or cognitive-noncognitive) dichotomy, as mentioned at the
beginning of §1.0, consists of two theses: (1) the denial that the world (what is real or
objective) contains any value, and (2) that facts alone do not motivate us to action – we
need desires or interests as well, which are fundamentally non-cognitive and subjective
(attitudinal). In order to reject the fact-value dichotomy, we must simply reject each of its
parts.
2.1: Refutation of Part One
There are two different though equally necessary points that must be made if our
rejection of the thesis that value is not objective is to be both effective and complete.
However, the first point has already been accomplished in the first chapter: the absolute
conception of the world, one that consists of only primary qualities to the exclusion of
values, is false. Aesthetic and moral qualities are two examples of value-qualities, and
although they are relative to us rather than in the world “as it is anyway,” they are still
objective. The rejection of an absolute conception of reality is partly the recognition that
objectivity and relativity are in fact fully compatible.
The second point is the problem of what Williams calls “thick” concepts, i.e.
concepts that are simultaneously evaluative and descriptive.108 Examples include
‘unscientific,’ ‘cruel,’ ‘cowardly,’ ‘dangerous,’ ‘kind,’ etc. Such concepts clearly are
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“guided by the world,” such that we can be mistaken in their application (which is to say
they’re truth-functional). For instance, we can be wrong about whether or not a person
really is cruel.109 Furthermore, because objectivity minimally requires the possibility of
being mistaken, the fact that such words have public conditions of application clearly defies
the fact-value dichotomy.
The prescriptivist, according to Williams, answers this challenge in the following
way: thick concepts are “factorable” into descriptive and prescriptive/evaluative
components. It is therefore possible, in theory, that with a different word or sentence, the
world could be described in the same way but without the prescriptive/evaluative
content.110 John McDowell and Hilary Putnam reply by denying that such concepts can
always be factored; rather, the prescriptive and descriptive aspects are “entangled” and
inseparable.111 Putnam writes that “what is characteristic of [thick concepts]… is that to
use them with any discrimination one has to be able to identify imaginatively with an
evaluative point of view. That is why someone who thought that ‘brave’ simply meant ‘not
afraid to risk life and limb’ would not be able to understand the all-important distinction
that Socrates keeps drawing between mere rashness or foolhardiness and genuine
bravery.”112
2.2: Refutation of Part Two
The second part of the fact-value dichotomy is that facts or ‘ises’ cannot by
themselves sufficiently motivate us to action – only volition or sentiment can do that.
However, we need ‘ises’ in order to correctly direct our action and not blindly grope about.
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In other words, the fact-value dichotomy presupposes the belief-desire theory of action. It
runs deeper: because cognitive mental states are, roughly, perceptual ones (i.e. the ones
that discover ‘ises’), it follows that cognition and volition are fundamentally disparate. In
other words, cognitive mental states and motivational mental states (one that would
presumably feature values) are mutually exclusive.
A perception of a state of affairs is a cognitive, intentional mental event. It is
intentional because we must be able to formulate the content of our perception using an
expression of the form “I see that…”, and it is cognitive because perception has a certain
“direction of fit”113 that allows for truth-functionality (to wit, “mind-to-world”). Volition,
desire, wishing, etc., meanwhile, are also intentional in the sense that they are directed at
an object, but they are not cognitive and are not truth-functional. Their direction of fit is
“world-to-mind.” Obviously, we can observe that somebody desires something and so the
sentence “Jacob desires f” could be true or false, but the desiring itself does not correspond
to the world in a truth-functional way. At best, it merely affects change.
In his paper “Virtue and Reason,” McDowell attempts to show that it is wrong to
think of perceptual (and therefore cognitive) mental states as being independent from
motivational (non-cognitive) ones. Often, instead of appealing to a “moral sensibility” (a
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sense that allows us to perceive the relevant moral saliences114 of a given state of affairs),
we explain actions through “practical syllogisms.” In such a syllogism, the major premise
is a moral rule (presumably with an attitudinal explanation), the minor premise is the
perceived state of affairs, and the conclusion is a judgment about how to act. For example,
if we take the rule “protect all persons who suffer present, incipient, or future violence,”
and we observe that one person is about to harm another, then we must conclude that we
ought to protect the relevant person.
McDowell objects that this picture of moral psychology (in which cognitive and
motivational mental states are independent) suggests that moral action is reducible to rulefollowing.115 However, any picture of moral psychology that is fundamentally rule-based
must presuppose a kind of moral sensibility or understanding, and thus becomes selfrefuting, for the moral sensibility is precisely what the rule-based theory is supposed to
explain away.116
Wittgenstein shows us in the Philosophical Investigations that rules do not
determine their own applications. Borrowing from Wittgenstein, McDowell argues that “if
one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then,
however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn
up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike us as wrong.”117 If we are
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to follow rules, then it would be a moral sensibility that enabled us to apply them
successfully.
The alternative to the above account of reasons or saliences (or at least rational
motivational forces) being essentially internal rather than objects of our cognitive,
perceptual mental states is clearly that they are external and objective. The moral
understanding or sensibility is the perceptual sensitivity to these saliences. A virtuous
person sees a situation in a unique way: they see that a certain subjective response is
required, and such a requirement ipso facto “silences” all possible reasons to act
otherwise.118
McDowell negatively argues for this position by attacking the common “prejudice”
which makes it seem implausible. It is simply not the case that there “ought to be a neutral
external standpoint from which the rationality of any genuine exercise of reason could be
demonstrated,” such as the practical syllogisms discussed earlier.119 That is, we should not
assume that we can model what it is like to have a perceptual sensitivity to external reasons
in a way that is essentially exclusive to such a point of view, and furthermore, the fact that
such a thing is not possible does not give us any reason to declare the explanandum false.
For example, the fact that a deaf person cannot know what a violin sounds like does not
imply that the violin does not have a sound. The fact that we cannot model the nature of
the perception of value in ways that are ultimately not capable of making such an
experience intelligible does not imply that such experiences are not possible.
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3.0: Internalism, Externalism, and Value
In the previous section I argued that values are objective and part of the world, i.e.
independent of us. In this section, I will explain how to make sense of this claim. What
does it mean for a value or a good to be objective? In other words, if normative claims are
(at least partly) facts about the world, then what are the nature of these facts? In order to
answer these questions, we must first introduce normative internalism and normative
externalism.
3.1: Normative Internalism
Normative internalism, or more specifically reasons internalism, is not one thesis
but a cluster of related theses about the relationship between our actions, choice
architectures, motivations, and reasons. Generally speaking, any variety of reasons
internalism will be a variation on the following idea: all possible reasons for action stand
in some essential relation to our concomitant motivational states. The precise nature of this
essential relation is differently accounted for by the many varieties of internalism (such as
counterfactual internalism, actual internalism, etc).
David Hume stands in a grandfather-like relation to contemporary reasons
internalism because of (1) his views on the psychology of action, and (2) his views on the
relationship between reasons and passions. Fundamentally, he claims that only desires can
motivate actions – beliefs alone are insufficient (something that McDowell and I rejected
in the previous section). The conventional account of a reason is simply “a consideration
that counts in favor of [or against] something.”120 Thus, reasons must figure into our choice
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architectures through beliefs and beliefs alone.121 It follows that reasons alone are
insufficient to motivate us to action, and that deliberate action is only possible through
some combination of reasons and desires, and is irrational or nonexistent otherwise.
The internalist position is much more than the claim that reasons alone cannot serve
as motivational grounds (though this does play an integral part). It is, rather, a thesis about
the identity of reasons, viz. that a proposition cannot be a reason unless it stands in some
essential relation to our motivations. Thus, Hume’s famous claim that reasons are enslaved
by the passions is interpreted as a particular manifestation of a larger claim that the identity
of a reason is to interface in some subordinate way with our desires, guiding our action, as
it were. Otherwise, the reason is not a reason at all, but merely a neutral proposition
describing some aspect of the world. The following syllogism illustrates reasons
internalism’s larger view in the standard or “classic” way, as Williams conceptualizes it:
1. Reason to A  motivation to A (central assumption of internalism)
2. All motivation  desires (Hume’s belief-desire theory of action)
// Reason to A  desire to A
The conclusion can then be transposed:
// desire to A  reason to A
The “essential relation” of reasons to motivational states is thus clarified, at least formally.
Following Williams, one only has reason to φ if φ-ing would advance some subjective
purpose or interest.122
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3.2: Normative Externalism
The rival of reasons internalism is reasons externalism, which, like internalism, is
a cluster of strongly associated yet varying theses about the relation between actions,
choice architecture, motivations, and reasons, rather than one particular doctrine. Generally
speaking, however, reasons externalism is simply the negation of reasons internalism: it is
not the case that all reasons must stand in some essential relation to motivational states,
such that we can have reasons that don’t “serve our passions.” The thought is, more
specifically, that we cannot be responsible for the reasons we have.
Arguments for reasons externalism could reject premise one (above). Rejecting
premise two and claiming that both desires and beliefs can motivate, even if justifiable,
wouldn’t do any good, for then our conclusion would just read “~desire&~belief to A 
~reason to A.” This is problematic because many of us want certain obligations to apply
absolutely (which is to say, to be inescapable), and externalism is purportedly compatible
with this expectation through its denial that there is a necessary connection between having
a reason and one’s motivational states. “Escapability” is clearly a natural feature of the
classic formulation of internalism discussed earlier, for reasons cease to apply to us as soon
as we stop having the prerequisite desires – we are allowed too much responsibility for
what reasons we actually have. If this is what externalism is supposed to ameliorate, then
rejecting the second premise would be pointless, because we would still be responsible for
what reasons we have (only with beliefs as well as desires making us responsible).
3.3: Clarifications and Distinctions
I contend that we should reject normative internalism and accept normative
externalism. Before I present my arguments, I would like to make several clarifications and
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distinctions. Firstly, internalism and externalism are not concerned with giving an account
of the necessary structure of our decision procedures. Rather, they are concerned with the
conditions under which a fact (such as “it is raining”) becomes a justificatory reason. In
other words, internalism and externalism seek to provide formal and necessary criteria for
the identity of all reasons.
Secondly, we must avoid confusing theories of rational choice or decision
procedures with theories of normativity. The former describes, as it were, the way we ought
to reason, or in a more austere, algorithmic sense, what choice is to be made in
circumstances C. The latter, meanwhile, clarifies the circumstances under which
obligations (both fragile and rigid) or, more weakly, normative facts appear, as well as their
power over us. Consider the following question: “why be moral?” We can deconstruct the
question into the following formulation: “why ought I to do what I ought?” I believe that
there are actually two questions muddled up here: the first is a question about decision
procedures: “what reason do I have to choose to do my duty?” The second is “why is my
duty my duty anyway? Why is this “ought” an “ought” at all?” Obviously, both of these
questions demand different kinds of answers; to even entertain the question originally
posed would be to commit a category error.
Thirdly, let us distinguish having a reason from being a reason. To have a reason is
for a fact or consideration, regarded as such, to be present in a deliberative consciousness.
Meanwhile, to be a reason is simply to be a fact that counts in favor of something. Whether
something is or is not a reason must be independent of our beliefs about it (on pain of
subjectivism). For example, the fact that there is reason to take the proper medicine is not
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created by the physician informing the patient that it will alleviate pain, but the physician
tells the patient this so that the patient, now having the reason, will act accordingly.123
Having a reason means that the agent’s action could be explained by way of that
reason. The patient takes his medicine because he knows that it will make him healthy
again. But for the patient to have this reason also presupposes that the reason applies to the
patient. If a reason could apply to us, then it must apply to us, even if we aren’t aware of
its applicability. Thus, while we can makes sense of the having of a reason through its role
in our action, we needn’t treat reasons by themselves in the same way.124 A fact is a reason
regardless of whether someone has it, and therefore regardless of its role in our action (in
this sense).
3.4: Critique of Internalism
Internalism, at least in its most general and traditional formulation being the claim
that something counts as a reason iff it “interfaces” with a preexisting desire, seems to be
muddled. Not only does it treat “what it is to be a reason” as “what it is to have a reason”
(for a reason is just something that figures into our choice architecture, and therefore
“reason-status” is entirely contingent upon our intentions/motives/wills), but it also thereby
gets decision-procedure theory confused with normative theory. Obligations (fragile or
rigid) or what reasons there are to A presuppose corresponding deliberative and
motivational mental states. In other words, desires, wishes, and interests necessarily come
prior to justifications, and the reverse is impossible such that talking about whether desires,
wishes, or interests are themselves justified is incoherent.
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Externalism avoids all of this muddling, because the idea that reasons could apply
to us independently of our deliberative/motivational mental states not only implies that the
identity of reasons is also independent of (makes no reference to) those same mental states
(thereby keep having and being separate). If r can be a reason without presupposing a
necessarily antecedent deliberative/motivational mental state, then that means that we can
be under obligations independently of our choice-architectures (thereby avoiding the
second muddled issue).
3.5: An Externalist Account of Value
In a short book review titled “The Unity of the Normative,” Tim Scanlon references
a typical internalist understanding of “good” by Paul Ziff, in which “good” is analyzed as
“answering to certain interests.”125 Under standard internalist doctrine, reasons, goods, etc.
stand in an essential relation to an agent’s motivational states such that the absence of those
motivational states implies that the reason/goodness/etc. is not actually a reason or a good.
All motivational states are necessarily prior to normative facts. “Escapability” is clearly a
natural feature of the classic formulation of internalism, for reasons/goods cease to
apply/exist as soon as we stop having the prerequisite desires – we are allowed too much
responsibility for what reasons we actually have and what goods actually exist.
The claim that something is valuable can then be understood in externalist terms as
a certain worthiness for particular actions, desires, etc., rather than a claim that they actually
are desired or action-motivating: two things which we must not conflate.126 Such a
distinction is only possible if externalism is correct, for it requires a particular explanatory
direction between a thing’s worthiness and the attitudes/actions that we take towards it,
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viz. that we desire it because it is worthy of our desire, and not the reverse, which would
involve the desire being prior to the normative fact (as described above).

4.0: Conclusion
It is highly plausible that sentences such as “x is better than y” are not mere
expressions of attitude, but that they may be cognitive and resist disentanglement into
discrete “objective fact” and “subjective value” components, in addition to the value that
they name being a real part of the world. That is not to say, however, that it is easy to
determine the truth-value of such sentences, nor is it to say that there necessarily exist any
such instantiations. In order to determine whether one food really is better than another, we
require a theory of food criticism. Nevertheless, it is a clear victory for the project at hand
that normative judgments (such as the ones that a food critical theory would) are cognitive
ones.

Appendix to Chapter Three: A Critique of Kant’s Aesthetics
Hitherto I have drawn more than significantly from Kant’s work, but at this point I
must distance myself. What I intend to do in this section is show why Kant’s aesthetics (or
any Kantian aesthetics in general) do not allow for normativity, and therefore why Kant
cannot adequately serve our purposes, at least not without several adjustments to the central
concept (or indeterminate idea, rather) of “beauty.” Kantian moral theory is objectivist
because in giving us an account of what morality consists in, we are then able to make
moral judgments that are either true or false (in principle). Of course, Kant notes that
introspection will never yield knowledge of our maxims, given that the autonomous will is
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essentially noumenal and therefore not a possible object of experience or thought.127 While
this is an epistemological inconvenience, however, it does not impugn the objectivity of
morality.
Kant’s aesthetics, meanwhile, seems to be at best quasi-objective. In the first
Critique, Kant demonstrates that underlying all judgments are concepts, such that the
former are made possible in the first place only through having the latter. However,
“beauty,” for Kant, is nothing but an indeterminate idea, and judgments of taste are
explicitly non-cognitive.128 This raises the question of how judgments of taste are even
possible, which Kant addresses in the antinomy of taste.129 Nevertheless, his answer fails
to satisfy those with stronger objectivist commitments. In concluding that judgments of
taste and the idea of beauty refer “beyond the horizon of the sensible” to the noumenal
world, we are left with the strangeness of judgments that seemingly cannot be mistaken;
either we successfully judge an object to be beautiful, or we fail to make a judgment of
taste at all. Stranger still, however, is that even successful judgments of taste, being noncognitive, cannot be “knowledge-functional.”
This is problematic for the intended normativity of the aesthetic. I have argued that
normative facts are intelligible through and only through justificatory reasons. If Kant’s
aesthetics does not allow for reason-giving, then it would be at best unintelligibly
normative (something that I have also argued is absurd), notwithstanding the noncognitivism of the subsequent aesthetic judgments and normative claims.
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Donald Crawford argues that despite the above strangeness, it is still possible to
give an account of disagreement within Kant’s framework. Disagreement is resolved
through the comparison of reasons for judgment, and in doing so we might realize that our
judgments were “impure,” which is to say, failed to be executed in strict conformity to the
formal necessary criteria of all judgments of taste, i.e. disinterestedness, contemplative and
not determining, etc.130 However, if the disagreement were capable of being resolved in
this way, then it would have to be only prima facie disagreement. If a judgment of taste is
just one executed in strict conformity to the criteria just listed, then impure judgments of
taste are actually not judgments of taste at all. Disagreement, rather, seems to presuppose
that two contradictory judgments of the same kind are being made.
Crawford would reply to this objection in two ways. He would first point out that
we cannot have conclusive reasons (or proof) of our judgments of taste – a fact that follows
from “beauty” being a mere indeterminate idea. Secondly, we can, in fact, give criteria for
an object to be beautiful, but only criteria limited by the above inconclusiveness imposed
by the necessary indemonstrability of judgements of taste. Those criteria would be, for
example, whether or not the object in question is formally purposive. These two
considerations are supposed to come together to show that two people can make
disagreeing judgments of taste which can only be partly reconciled, but reconciled
nevertheless by mutually endeavoring to identify whether an object is formally purposive.
I believe that this reply fails, because if a person were already in the proper mental state to
successfully execute a pure judgment of taste, then those discrepancies could not arise. The
reason that disinterestedness is imperative for any judgment of taste, for example, is
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because seeing objects as purposive would be impossible otherwise; the two really are just
flip-sides of the same coin.
The original problem thus remains unsolved: we cannot give an account of a
judgment of taste being in correct (in the sense that it is both true and justifiable) except
by appealing to the very identity of what a judgment of taste is. Since any normative
framework requires the possibility that justificatory reasons can be provided, it seems that
Kant’s aesthetics is therefore an inadequate ground for the type of normative aesthetics that
I am concerned with. While I am not claiming that Kant is necessarily wrong, we must
move on to a different theoretical framework that will allow for normative outputs.131
There exists further and perhaps more trenchant reason why Kant’s aesthetics
simply cannot accommodate normative claims – better yet, a reason with which Kant
would arguably agree. He notes that the beautiful, “which is judged on the ground of mere
formal purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without a purpose, is wholly independent of the
representation of the good,” something that presupposes objective purposiveness.132 Any
normative system, even Kant’s, would make some essential reference to goods or ends or
both, and so on that front Kant’s aesthetics is automatically excluded on grounds of
incompatibility.
I would like to pose the following question: at what point does the dichotomy
between morality and teleology (as Kant understands them) break down and why? Kant
writes in the Grounding that “an absolutely good will, whose principle must be a

131
The extent to which Kant’s aesthetics is normative is a point of controversy among his
interpreters; something that often hinges on how “subjective universal validity” is analyzed. However, the
normativity discussed by Ginsborg and Ameriks is that of logical necessity, and not the kind that I am
concerned with. Rogerson argues that the normativity of the subjectively universally valid is, in fact, moral,
but his reading of Kant is shallow, naïve, and uninformed such that we ought to dismiss it.
132
Kant, Critique of Judgment 226

73

categorical imperative, […] will contain merely the form of willing; and indeed that form
is autonomy.”133 Ted Cohen, in his short but insightful piece “Why Beauty is a Symbol of
Morality” observes that because autonomy requires of the good will (or, rather, requires of
itself) that it only takes ends which are not external to itself (upon pain of heteronomy), it
can and must only take itself as an end.134 Meanwhile, Kant writes in the Critique of
Judgment that objective purposiveness (teleology), insofar as the end is external it is called
utility, and insofar as it is internal it is called perfection.135 Internal objective purposiveness
(perfection) clearly resembles (if only partly) the free will, for it would have an end
internally rather than bearing them from an external source. Kant elaborates upon the
concept of (teleological) perfection in the following way: it is “the agreement of the
manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end,”136 and then more
lucidly, “so in order to represent an objective purposiveness [perfection] in a thing we must
first have a concept of what sort of thing it is to be.”137 I believe that there is adequate
support for the notion that autonomy/morality and perfection/teleology break down at this
very point.
However, Kant (1) insists at CJ 227 that objective purposiveness is not
(empirically) knowable, (2) concludes at CJ 345-346 that judgments of perfection (as a
way of escaping the antinomy of taste) would be “otiose and nugatory” as a function of
them making essential reference to something supersensible, (3) says at CJ 360-361 that
judgments of objective purposiveness can only be reflective (not determining) and even
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then only for the purpose of rendering the manifold of nature intelligible by analogy when
our purely mechanical explanations fail us, (4) asserts the very concept of perfection to be
“empty and indeterminate,”138 and finally (5) argues that “to suppose a formal objective
purposiveness that is yet devoid of any purpose, i.e. the mere form of a perfection (apart
from any matter or concept of that with which it is to agree, even though there was the
mere general idea of a conformity to law) is a veritable contradiction.”139
The weakest point of the five above is (5), and pressing it could be fruitful. The
thought that Kant’s framework of Zweckmässigkeit could be reconstructed through
emergent aesthetic conditions of satisfaction (and that therewith we could make “objective,
formal purposiveness” more plausible) is certainly an exciting one, for then the locus of
the aesthetic domain would be the nexus of the moral and teleological domains. However,
at the moment it is mere fanciful speculation – a lowly embryo with an uncertain and not
necessarily promising future.

138
139

Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 443
Kant, Critique of Judgment 228

75

CHAPTER FOUR: ON NORMATIVE AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS
0.1: Introduction
For Kant, aesthetic judgments are only quasi-objective. They do not admit of
reason-giving, and instead of being cognitive (based on intuition), they are non-cognitive
and based on feeling. The resulting “subjective universal validity” of aesthetic judgments
(as opposed to genuine objectivity) gives the aesthetic domain a distinct irrational140
character, and consequently reveals just how much Kant has actually conceded to Hume.
However, I argue that this concession is unwarranted. Hume’s famous declaration that
“goodness is determined merely by pleasure,” the ultimate ground of this irrational,
“internalist aesthetics,” is mistaken.141 I am willing to grant that certain kinds of pleasure,
as well as certain motivational states such as desire all figure into aesthetics in some way
(for example, part of what it is to understand that something is beautiful is to see that it is
worthy of desire, as well as to be disposed to enjoy it in addition to any mere gratification
that it brings). However, Hume, Kant, and unfortunately many others have it backwards –
these allegedly non-cognitive mental states are not necessarily independent of rationality.
The rationality of aesthetics is just this: there are any number of ways that we could
take pleasure in an object (or arrangement of objects), but only one of these ways is
compatible with aesthetic facts being objective and aesthetic judgments being cognitive.
One can desire an object, or at least hold it to be valuable, because it satisfies a preexisting
interest or need. But in these cases, any subsequent behavior with regards to that object
would be grounded in that object’s utility. Furthermore, any pretending normative
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judgments of that object (whether x is better or worse than y, whether a pairs better with x
than b, etc.) would be contingent upon those interests, needs, or desires. In other words,
those aesthetic normative facts would not be facts at all, for they would be escapable. Such
escapability is incompatible with aesthetic normative objectivity, because objectivity
requires that whatever obtains does so independently of our beliefs or interests. Perhaps
this was Kant’s point in maintaining that judgments of beauty must necessarily be
disinterested. (However, though surely aesthetic judgments cannot have interests or desires
at their heart in the way described above, we must not conclude that desire and aesthetic
judgments must be separated by an insurmountable barrier).
Another way that we could hold an object (or arrangement of objects) to be
aesthetically valuable demonstrates the rationality of aesthetic judgments: that we judge an
object to possess a certain dignity, and consequently judge it to be worthy of our desire.
Any pleasure we take in the object, or for that matter, any aesthetically-minded behavior
with regards to that object, is grounded in (rather than prior to) our rational engagement of
that object. On this externalist account, aesthetic facts are not determined by our beliefs or
interest. They are properly objective, and it is possible that we might be in proper
agreement regarding such facts (though obviously not assured). Furthermore, any aesthetic
normative facts that obtain must do so for all rational beings regardless of their interests.
In other words, we cannot deny that x actually should be paired with y rather than z simply
because we like the taste of xz better than xy. Aesthetic normativity must be inescapable in
this manner.
The successful completion of the following tasks are necessary to support the
picture I have developed above: firstly, I will explain how the aesthetic is normative.
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Secondly, I will clarify the nature of aesthetic judgments. Thirdly, I will propose a
metaphysics under which aesthetic judgments are possible.

1.0 Aesthetic Normativity
The idea that the aesthetic is normative should seem intuitively correct to us. Take
the ordinary, mundane case of painting my kitchen. If I were to paint the walls black, would
I have made a mistake? Or perhaps we would at least be willing to concede that there could
have been a better, more appropriate color, given the purposes that a kitchen has, and given
what we expect from/in a kitchen environment? Other examples: “this soup is too salty.”
“This music is out of tune.” These claims are not claims about preferences, as some could
object: to say that “this soup is too salty” is partly to express a preference for a particular
salt-level, and also to say ‘yuk’ to the actual level of salt. I do not want to deny that the
sentence that we are analyzing cannot mean this when uttered by any given person, but
rather, it alternatively could express the idea that the soup is supposed to taste a certain
way, and the way that the soup actually tastes is wrong (not morally, but rather,
aesthetically). Furthermore, it seems unproblematic that the sentence “this soup is too
salty” could be expressing any combination of the above propositions or attitudes (‘yuk’).
Similarly, the sentence “this music is out of tune” could express the idea that the way it
sounds causes me some displeasure, but it also could express the thought that it is supposed
to sound a certain way, and the way it actually sounds is (aesthetically) wrong because it
fails to achieve this. Obviously, what the sentence actually means in any given utterance is
an empirical question, but the point that I am making, that aesthetics is a normative domain,
is already one that appears in multiple, acceptable, intuitive ways in our daily life.
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There is another class of examples that are even stronger, but also reveal something
important about the phenomenology of aesthetic normativity. In section two of An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, Hume discusses the famous and controversial
phenomenon of “the missing shade of blue.” (Important to note is that I am using Hume’s
example for an entirely different purpose than Hume himself. He wants to demonstrate the
plausibility of a non-experiential source of ideas, whereas I am intending to motivate the
thought that we observe aesthetic conditions in a normative way). When all the shades of
the color blue are put in chromatic order and then one is removed, we are able to make
three important observations.142 Firstly, that there is a color absent; a color that is supposed
to be there! The fact that we can detect the absence of a color seems to presuppose the
normativity in question, because it would not make sense to say that something is really
absent if its presence wasn’t required (or at least implied) in the first place. Secondly, we
can easily identify the relevant or salient features of the absent color which make it
demanded in the first place (in this case, its hue).143 Thirdly, we intuitively and naturally
understand aesthetic normativity in terms or success conditions (I will come back to this
point in §3). All that is required to understand how a given set of objects ought to be
arranged (relative to the aesthetically salient features of those objects) is the perception of
the actual, incorrect arrangement; we perceive states of affairs and infer “ideal” versions
thereof, which we use like an overlay-measure.
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1.1: The Autonomy of Normative Aesthetics
There remains one important observation that the example of the chromatic
ordering of colors allows us to make. If we grant that “hue h is supposed to be present at
location l” (and I see no reason why we should not), then to what source does this normative
fact owe its truth? If we were to explain hue h’s absence by appealing to our expectations,
then we would relapse into normative internalism (for the fact that h is missing is due to
our unsatisfied desire that it be present). Were that to be the case, the normative facts would
not be normative at all, but rather, authoritarian and subjective, for the valid predication of
“good” or “correct” would entirely dependent upon the antecedent interests of the
individual or a popular majority.144
Let us turn away from combinations of colors to combinations of tastes. We could
offer different criteria of correctness, such as “the best food is that which is prepared best,”
or “the best food is that which is most authentic to its cuisine of origin,” etc. However,
these food-critical theories, while not strictly subjectivist, still impose a standard upon the
evaluand that answers to our expectations or interests. To say that a dish is prepared
mistakenly is not subjective, but an objective measure of quality does not necessarily
follow. Furthermore, there is the question of how we are to choose between these different
possibilities without simply begging the question.
These considerations are intended to motivate the following thought: the
justification for the normative fact that (returning to chromatic colors) hue h is required at
location l is “internal” to the object, and makes no reference to our desires, demands, or
expectations. Such a feature is necessary if these normative facts are to be objective. In

144

Paul Ziff holds such a view of “good.” See Scanlon’s “The Unity of the Normative” 445

80

other words, aesthetic normativity is autonomous in the following sense: its correctness or
incorrectness is determined purely by the relationships between its own features or
components, and thus any justification for any particular aesthetic feature’s presence or
position cannot come from an external source. Thus, there is a sense in which a correct
arrangement of objects is self-justifying.
The autonomy of aesthetic normativity allows us an escape from being forced to
arbitrarily choose one externally assigned theory over another and thereby beg the question.
Since the justification comes from the aesthetic object itself, that justification will, and
indeed must obtain in all circumstances insofar as that aesthetic object remains itself. (The
idea that aesthetic objects’ normativity is autonomous in the sense that they justify
themselves is puzzling; an explanation of how this is possible will be provided in §3).
1.2: Normative Hierarchy
Though not an objection to aesthetic normativity per se, one could make trouble by
arguing that while it is certainly true that we use normative aesthetic language in everyday
life, such language misleads us as to the importance of this specific normativity, especially
when compared to the moral domain. This point appeals to the falsity of the parity thesis.
The central claim of the parity thesis, according to Richard Yetter Chappell, is that
“any normative status that's applicable to acts can just as well apply to other possible
objects of evaluation, from eye colours to climates.”145 This means that “the normative
domain is symmetrically structured, such that actions and eye colours are on a par when it
comes to the ways in which we normatively assess them.”146 The denial of the parity thesis
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therefore is just the claim that not all normativity is equal because of normative
asymmetricality.
Chappell is correct in rejecting the parity thesis. However, I believe that he not only
does so for the wrong reasons, but he also overestimates the implications of this rejection.
Firstly, undergirding Chappell’s argument is the thought that the principal structural seat
of the normative domain is exhausted by forms of “rational output” such as action or belief,
or generally, anything that has, in principle, some kind of rational architecture. 147 He
explains that “one cannot possess one's eye colour for (normative) reasons, the way that
one can believe, desire, and act for reasons. […] While we can evaluate anything, against
any arbitrary set of ‘alternatives,’ there is a special kind of normative assessment of
rationally available actions that has no analogue for other (mere) evaluands.”148 This
echoes a point that Scanlon makes: “it makes no sense to demand a reason in this sense [a
consideration that counts in favor of something] for an event in the world that is
unconnected with any intentional subject.”149 However, this cannot be correct; for
something to have some rational architecture presupposes that it is subject to justificatory
reasons, such that the latter is more fundamental than the former. If all that is minimally
required for normativity is the possibility of justification, then there can be no question that
the moral and the aesthetic are both normative in rational ways.
Secondly, if the moral and the aesthetic are not on a “normative par,” that does not
imply that one will always take “normative priority” over the other. Rather than there being
“greater” and “lesser” normative domains, all that we really need to see is that the
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normativities are to some degree incommensurate. Aesthetic normativity is not meaningful
for us in the same way as moral normativity (as will be discussed in §2), so the possibility
of a clear normative hierarchy seems suspect.
The deeper question raised by Chappell’s discussion of the parity thesis is whether
the aesthetic and moral normative domains ever conflict or take priority in certain
circumstances. To this, I am afraid that I have no answer (or at least none to which I am
committed) other than that it doesn’t seem self-contradictory upon a cursory consideration.
Ted Cohen notes that there is a weak precedent for reducing aesthetics to morality,150 while
Carolyn Korsmeyer discusses whether morality and aesthetics can “collide” in the context
of food.151 Despite the richness of this controversy, it lies outside of the ambit of the
immediate project. All that is of concern for us at this time is that even if the normative
domain is asymmetrical, this does not necessarily deflate the normative significance of the
aesthetic.

2.0 Aesthetic Judgments
There are three fundamental features of aesthetic judgments that must be
recognized. Firstly, they are objective. Secondly, they are normative. Thirdly, I contend
that they involve the recognition of dignity or worthiness in their objects.152 This latter
feature is of critical importance in understanding how aesthetic normativity is meaningful
for us. There is a sense in which aesthetic norms are not for us (to better see this, compare
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the following normative claims: “one ought to not engage in exploitative practices.” “taste
x ought to be present whenever taste y is present”). Because we are not the recipients, it
would be absurd to suggest that we could somehow fail the normative claim that “x ought
to be present whenever y and z are also present.” The recognition of dignity and worthiness
means that we are nevertheless affected by aesthetic normativity even if we are not
necessarily the primary recipients of normative aesthetic claims.
2.1: The Faculty of Taste
McDowell understands “virtue” to be a perceptual capacity specifically sensitive to
salient moral features of a given situation.153 Furthermore, because virtue is a perceptual
capacity, judgments of morality presuppose the exercise of a clear concept of morality. To
have the concept of morality is not only, according to McDowell, to be able to discern the
morally salient features of situations, but it is also tantamount to understanding how to
respond to those observations.
I understand “Taste” (not to be confused with the “taste” of food) in precisely the
same way: it is a perceptual capacity specifically sensitive to aesthetic conditions of
satisfaction.154 Being a perceptual capacity, Taste can be cultivated and honed. It is also
capable of being mistaken, as well as influenced by external conditions (there are less than
ideal conditions for exercising our Taste), which was discussed in chapter two. To have a
well-developed faculty of Taste is to have a clear concept of beauty. To have this concept
is to be able to judge successfully in accordance with it. To judge something as beautiful
is, at least in part, to recognize the object of judgment as possessing a kind of dignity. The
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recognition of dignity is to be disposed to behave in certain ways towards the dignified
thing (whether object or person). Furthermore, because the concept of beauty (which
underlies aesthetic sensibility) and the capacity for intentional action cannot be
disentangled, it follows that the only beings capable of having the concept of beauty are
those who are also rational agents.
The specific kinds of behavior to which a person with strong faculty of taste is
disposed are functions of the necessary recognition of dignity. There are many conceivable
kinds of action that take the recognition of dignity as their maxim, such as engaging in
care-behavior like maintenance and cultivation, or simply treating dignified objects with
respect. Perhaps most significant for us, however, is desire.
Given our normative externalism, we can say that dignified objects are worthy of
(for example) being desired. A “desirability characterization” of such an object would
make no reference to the subjective interests of any agent.155 A person with a strong faculty
of Taste is indeed predisposed to desire objects she judges to be beautiful, but the desire is
disinterested: the desire is not grounded in the object’s utility, but rather, its dignity; it is
desirable for its own sake, and thus it is worthy of the desire of all rational beings.156 This
does not imply that all rational beings will desire it.157 However, if someone did not
recognize the dignity of the object (which is the only thing referenced by its desirability
characterization), they would nevertheless be in error, for its dignity must be objective.
However, this leaves us with an apparent puzzle: if at least part of what it is to make
an aesthetic judgment is to recognize the object of judgment as possessing a kind of dignity
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or worthiness, and if that recognition consists in being disposed to behave in certain ways
with regards to that object, then there would seem to be some inseparability of our cognitive
judgments and our non-cognitive motivational states; the ghost of internalism has returned
to haunt us. This puzzle clearly demands a solution given our other commitments.
2.2: The Rationality of Desire
The relationship between cognitive and motivational states is complex. More
specifically, the relationship between reason and desire is complex. Internalism is attractive
because it's intuitive that all action requires motivation. However, its appealing simplicity
is actually under-sophistication: internalism requires that all motivation be antecedent to
the reasons that exist, such that it is incoherent to say “you ought to have reason r” (see
chapter three). The only reasons that we could have, even the ones that we are unaware of,
are the ones that are subordinate to our motivational states: to suggest that we ought to have
reason r (but don't) would also be to assert that we ought to have Motivational State m, but
the possibility of such an assertion's coherence would require that motivational states are
not prior to reasons. Since the possibility of such an assertion seems certain to me, I feel
justified in rejecting internalism.
McDowell neatly points out that we should be careful when drawing the line
between internalism and externalism; while internalism requires that motivation be prior
to reason, externalism needn’t require reason’s total autonomy from motivation, such that
“friction” between the two is impossible.158 Rather, we should understand external reasons
to be ones that, when considered “aright,” give rise to the appropriate sorts of
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motivations.159 This way we can make sense of the “ghost” of internalism discussed above
without actually resurrecting it.
The moral (or just generally, normative) realist needs the truth-conditions of
normative claims to be independent from our subjective interests or psychological states.
However, normative claims often purport to give reasons (or at least pro-attitudes) for
action, belief, etc., which themselves (the actions or whatever) would seem to presuppose
the relevant motivational states. This will not lead us back to internalism, at least
necessarily, if we can give an externalist account of motivation. While pains (for example)
motivate us because of their unique phenomenology, desires motivate us because they
involve viewing the object of desire as desirable. Internalism implies that an object's
desirability is solely a product of whether or not it is actually desired. Externalism,
meanwhile, entertains the antithesis: something can be desirable whether or not it is in fact
desired.160
Normative realism is compatible with the thesis that all action requires some
underlying motivational state if we hold that the recognition of desirability, a rational and
cognitive process, can be prior to the motivational states which then give rise to action.
Platts observes that “the logical independence of the desirability remains to give the
motivation in the absence of any distinctive phenomenological quality. That it is the view
of the content of the desire rather than its phenomenological quality that constitutes its
motivating force still serves to yield an argument that desirability is prior to desire; it is
merely that recognition of desirability brings desire with it.”161 When we desire, we desire
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that ‘p.’ We desire things under certain descriptions. This connects with McDowell’s
thought that external reasons, when considered “aright,” give rise to motivation.162 Platts
writes that “to recognize the obtaining of, say, some desirable moral feature in a possible
state of affairs is to desire the obtaining of that state of affairs (though not just that). One
cannot see the loyal, the courageous, and so forth AS the loyal, the courageous, etc.,
without desiring them.”163 McDowell expresses a similar thought in “Virtue and Reason”
when he describes virtues to be perceptual capacities whose underlying concepts not only
allow an agent to make moral judgments, but whose possession sufficiently disposes the
agent to behave accordingly. To truly and sincerely judge something as immoral is also to
avoid it and discourage others with regards to it.
The only way aesthetic normativity can be inescapable is if the desirability
characterizations make no reference to the agent’s motivational states, in which case, one
has a reason to desire the object not because of its utility, but for its own sake (for its
dignity).
2.3: The Connection between Dignity and Desirability
The recognition of the dignity of an object (and consequently the disposition to
behave towards that object with a special respect of this dignity) arises from considering it
“aright.” (What exactly it is to be considered “aright” will be explored in §3). Part of what
it is for an object to be dignified is for it to be worthy of our desire. But for an object to be
truly worthy of our desire and not merely desired (two things that are often conflated) is
for it to be desirable independent of our interests – in other words, it is to be desired for its
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own sake, and not merely for its utility.164 Clearly, to desire an object because of its utility
does not require the recognition of any dignity.
If there is any reason that an object could be desirable for its own sake (such that
its desirability is never contingent, i.e. it is always desirable in this way), then this reason
must be that its aesthetic normativity is autonomous in the way discussed above. It is out
of this autonomy that an object’s dignity arises, and hence its desirability (or rather, the
possibility of desiring it for its own sake). In other words, the only way that an object could
be desired disinterestedly (in which its desirability characterizations make no reference to
our interests) is for it to be dignified, and this dignity is only possessed on the condition
that the aesthetic object’s normativity be self-justifying (that it be autonomous). But this
suitability for disinterested desire (and therefore the desire of all rational beings) is
precisely what it is to be worthy of desire. Therefore, the link between dignity and
worthiness of aesthetic objects is that a necessary condition for being worthy of the desire
of all rational beings is dignity (and thus autonomy), and a sufficient condition for an
object’s dignity is that it can be desired disinterestedly. To actually desire an aesthetic
object for its own sake and not merely as a means to an end requires, at least in part, the
recognition of the object’s dignity.

164
The “merely” here is doing quite a lot of work. I am suggesting that one could, in principle,
desire an object because of its utility, but at the same time recognize it as desirable for its own sake,
without contradiction. The same thought is expressed when Kant entreats us in the second formulation of
the categorical imperative to always regard humanity, whether in one’s own person or in the person of
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3.0: Metaphysics of Aesthetics
Many philosophers are willing to grant that tastes are real. Some are also prepared
to defend the claim that we can perceive them successfully. Nevertheless, food is still
dismissed as a possible aesthetic object on the grounds that tastes (and smells) are without
structure. Monroe Beardsley writes:
“We cannot, at least not yet, arrange [tastes and smells] in series, and so we
cannot work out constructive principles to make larger works out of them.
[…] there does not seem to be enough order within these sensory fields to
construct aesthetic objects with balance, climax, development, or
pattern.”165
Besides the minimal structure that tastes have as a result of being possible objects of
experience (see chapter two), appealing to emergent aesthetic conditions of satisfaction
allows for tastes to have structure in Beardsley’s more specific sense.
It is a very strange claim that we perceive conditions of satisfaction. However, there
more than enough examples present in ordinary life to support this claim (such as the
chromatic colors). Consider as well the following, hopefully familiar cases: a single book
on a bookshelf is upside-down. The traffic-lines on a road were painted over a manhole
cover which was later rotated 35° off-center. A tiled floor was installed sloppily and many
of the tiles don’t conform to the pattern. A cake is cut such that the vertex of the incisions
is actually three centimeters away from the cake’s geometrical center. If one willing to
grant these examples in which conditions of satisfaction are easily perceivable, then you
should also be willing to accept the following: an F-natural in the key of E Major. The taste
of tequila in a martini. Wearing 42R suit-jacket when you’re only 36R.
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The question is not whether we in fact perceive conditions of aesthetic satisfaction,
but rather, how this phenomenon is possible in the first place. Firstly, we should not be
thinking of these conditions as components of their objects. We also cannot think of them
as metaphysically independent of their objects. The correct approach, I believe, is to
understand them as emergent: they appear systemically within sufficiently complex
systems.
Secondly, we should understand these emergent conditions of satisfaction as
semantic rather than ontological. Conditions of satisfaction are not really distinct
properties, but are “caused by and realized in” the actual properties and relations of any
given object or arrangement of objects. A helpful analogy could be drawn between Searle’s
discussion of the raising of his arm.166 We would not want to say that the raising of one’s
arm and the chemical reactions within one’s muscles were ontologically distinct. Rather,
there was only one event, but we can describe this event in different ways, such that the
former (the arm being raised) is “realized in” the latter (the chemical reactions). I contend
that aesthetic conditions of satisfaction are analogous.
Eddy Zemach argues for a similar position in Real Beauty. Aesthetic properties, for
Zemach, supervene upon non-aesthetic properties because we cannot describe one in terms
of the other without losing something essential; they are fundamental and non-reducible.
However Zemach claims (mistakenly, I think) that this supervenience owes its reality to
the fact that we observe non-aesthetic features of objects “through a special medium:
desire.”167
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Zemach’s claim has distinct normative internalist commitments: presumably we are
only capable of perceiving that something is beautiful if we have a particular antecedent
desire or interest, and an object could be both beautiful and not beautiful solely because of
what motivational and appetitive states the perceivers were in. Zemach acknowledges that
this has an “irrealistic flavor,”168 and continues to further reveal his internalism by claiming
that “a mind that has no interests… cannot see things aesthetically,” and “X is lovely only
if we love it and desire to have X (in some way).”169 I have already dismissed internalism
as confused, and so because of this I also reject Zemach’s position. The thought that objects
can have emergent conditions of aesthetic satisfaction is entirely consistent with normative
externalism, and we need not posit a special necessary relation between the objects and our
mental states in order to justify their existence; such a maneuver implicitly points to some
form of absolute realism, which was rejected in chapter one.
If we accept that aesthetic conditions of satisfaction emerge from the properties of
their objects, then we can use a special language to describe how the satisfaction-conditions
of different objects interact. For example, it is not nonsense to describe two flavors as
agreeing, or a cluster of three pitches to be discordant. Our special vocabulary includes
members such as “harmony,” “unity,” “coherence,” “compatibility,” “consistency,” etc.,
as well as their antonyms, synonyms, and hyponyms. We can even speak of certain
arrangements of objects “implying” other objects, such as in the case of the chromatic
colors, or cleverly used negative-spaces. Something is “implied” if it would make an
arrangement a unified or complete whole, and that whole is coherent if there are no
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emergent conditions of satisfaction that are unsatisfied.170 Consider the traditional Japanese
aesthetic style of wabi-sabi. It is able to successfully conjure ideas of vacuums,
asymmetrically, incompleteness, and imperfection though the judicious yet graceful
exploitation of emergent conditions of satisfaction. We do not merely feel a sense of
tranquil emptiness when observing a wabi-sabi temple, but we actually perceive the
negative-space where a missing “puzzle-piece” is implied to be.
It is also clear that some objects can be aesthetically contradictory or at least
inconsistent if their emergent conditions of satisfaction do not allow mutual fulfillment –
such arrangements we call ugly.
3.1: The Grounds of Dignity
In the same way that we provide desirability characterizations, we could provide
“dignity characterizations” – descriptions of the object in light of which it possesses its
dignity. (Of course, because aesthetic desirability is only possible (so I have argued) in
light of an object’s dignity, such a “dignity characterization” would really be an “aesthetic
desirability characterization”). These dignity (or aesthetic desirability) characterizations
would resemble the justification of an aesthetic object’s normativity, which I argued cannot
be done by an appeal to outside expectations imposed upon the object. The justification for
the presence or omission of any particular aesthetic feature from a whole cannot come from
an external source, for if it were to, then it its normativity would not be objective. If an
aesthetic object is autonomously normative (in this sense), then it is also worthy of our
desire (and other “respect-behaviors”) independently of any actual desire (or respect-

“Implied” is in “scare quotes” because there is no implication in the literal sense. Rather, for
something to be implied requires the possibility that we could perceive its absence from a whole. This
language is a modification of Beardsley’s discussion of wholes, parts, and unity. See Beardsley 191-195
170
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behaviors), for the possibility of these behaviors presuppose that the object need not be
linked to interests. But to be worthy of this kind of behavior is precisely what it is to be
dignified.
A particular arrangement of two objects is aesthetically normative (or justified) if
and only if the emergent conditions of satisfaction of one of the objects are satisfied by the
salient features possessed by the other object and vice-versa (they are harmonious). This
is the way in which an aesthetic object is “self-justifying,” for none of its parts could be
absent without that absence being clearly perceivable, and therefore presupposing that such
presence is actually “implied.” Thus, a truly beautiful object, on my view, has emergent
conditions of satisfaction which effectively are satisfied by itself. Furthermore, only objects
that possess such inner harmony can be worthy of the desire of all rational beings, for only
such objects satisfy the conditions for autonomous normativity (and for this reason, the
overlap between worthiness of desire and inner harmony occurs precisely at the point of
inner justification). Beautiful objects make demands or requests (in the sense that they have
conditions of satisfaction), and the way that they automatically satisfy these demands
simply by being themselves is the basis not only of their aesthetic normative autonomy,
but also their dignity and consequently the possibility of taking them as ends in themselves
(and not merely as means to ends) in our respect-behaviors and disinterested desire.

94

PREFACE TO ALL FUTURE FOOD CRITICISM
If the quality of food – its worthiness of our desire and respect, or in other words,
its beauty – consists in the perfect harmony of the emergent conditions of satisfaction of
its different tastes, then to engage in food criticism is to systematically and methodically
identify these instances of harmony and disharmony. James Thurber’s famous cartoon,
originally published in The New Yorker, reads “It’s a naïve domestic Burgundy without
any breeding, but I think you’ll be amused by its presumption.”171 The caption is obviously
a lampoon, yet the point is well taken – descriptions of food (or in this case, wine) can (and
traditionally have) easily become comically literary and absurd. This is a clear example of
food criticism gone wrong.
The parable of “the emperor’s new clothes” is often referenced with regards to the
modern practice of food criticism. The claim is that of collective ignorance: all
participating members are complete charlatans. However, while perhaps each individual is
aware of their own ignorance, they simultaneously believe in the non-ignorance of the
others. This results in a haphazard mock-community of “prisoners” trapped in a role, in
perilous perpetuity, unable to escape the gridlock for terror of the possible, embarrassing
revelation that they had, in fact, been merely pretending. Regardless of this assessment’s
truth or falsity, it should bother us no more, for we now have a new, clearer picture of what
it is that food criticism aims to do, as well as what is decisive in the accomplishment of
that goal.
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Rather than making pedantic and loosely-associated observations about the minutia
of a taste profile, we should aim to describe the way in which the tastes of food interact in
a harmonious narrative. David Williams, wine-writer for the Huffington Post, writes:
“A really good tasting note will also give you a sense of something more
elusive: of the wine’s flow and feel, of how the flavours dovetail both with
each other and with the wine’s texture, of its context in nature and the world
of winemaking. All the things, in fact, that make a wine worth drinking,
and, despite the inevitable ridicule, talking and writing about.”172
Naturally, sometimes this can be extremely difficult, but this is a problem of
application, not of the theory itself. As a consolation, we can always control, at least to
some degree, the conditions under which we taste. Furthermore, we can always learn or
improve in our capacity to discern these relevant features in the same way that one learns
to be a moral person by acquiring virtue through habituation. For example, we might study
paradigm cases of good food in order to acquire a sharper concept thereof which can then
better direct our criticism. The following examples, I believe, properly prepared and tasted
under the right conditions, demonstrate an internal unity from which we can learn: certain
kinds of nigari (such as tuna or snapper), coffee and chocolate tart, croissant and orange
marmalade, gin and olives, egg yolk and fresh black pepper, etc.
“Good foods are more like rock gardens than paintings”173 because of their
necessary constitutive harmony and unity – all that is required to destroy the balance and
symmetry is to remove one of its parts. Meanwhile, bad foods are ones that are
constitutively chaotic and discordant: plain tofu and plain yogurt, lavender and chive, and
salted romaine lettuce. Surely there are also some foods that are neutral, whose tastes are
indifferent towards each other. Perhaps white bread and dried apricot, or cucumber and
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boiled chicken. And what of foods with only one taste? In chapter two, I argued that a taste
is a highly complex, multi-aspectual phenomenon, yet it seems at least logically possible
that such a food could exist. What, if anything, could we say about them? Perhaps there
may be reasons (even aesthetic ones) that make these objects worthy of our desire and
respect. However, it is not food criticism, but a different sort of evaluative enterprise that
rests upon different principles, possibly including competence, artistry, innovation, etc.
Surely there is much more that could be said, but at a later time, and in a different project.
A final note: it should be observed that, because of the nature of normative aesthetic
judgments, to engage in food criticism is not merely to identify beautiful objects with
respect to their tastes. The perceptual capacity that allows us to attend to the tastes of food
and see that they are beautiful, ugly, or otherwise, is also the same perceptual capacity
whose correct exercise consists in the perception of reasons, whether for desire, action, or
other kinds of behaviors. To truly engage in food criticism, then, is inseparable from being
a discriminating eater, from refining one’s faculty of Taste, and the pursuit of what is
beautiful with respect to tastes. In other words, food criticism, much like philosophy in
general, is not just a knowledge-yielding practice, but also one that informs and guides our
everyday lives.

97

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anliker, J. A., L. Bartoshuk, A. M. Ferris, and L. D. Hooks. “Children’s Food Preferences
and Genetic Sensitivity to the Bitter Taste of 6-N-Propylthiouracil (PROP).” The
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 54, no. 2 (August 1991): 316–20.
Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention. 2 edition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2000.
Bartoshuk, Linda M. “Comparing Sensory Experiences Across Individuals: Recent
Psychophysical Advances Illuminate Genetic Variation in Taste Perception.”
Chemical Senses 25, no. 4 (August 1, 2000): 447–60. doi:10.1093/chemse/25.4.447.
Beardsley, Monroe C. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958.
Beauchamp, G. K., B. J. Cowart, and M. Moran. “Developmental Changes in Salt
Acceptability in Human Infants.” Developmental Psychobiology 19, no. 1 (January
1986): 17–25. doi:10.1002/dev.420190103.
Blakeslee, Albert F. “Genetics of Sensory Thresholds: Taste for Phenyl Thio Carbamide.”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
18, no. 1 (January 1932): 120–30.
Brady, Emily. “Smells, Tastes, and Everyday Aesthetics.” In The Philosophy of Food,
edited by David M. Kaplan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
Brentano, Franz. “The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena.” In
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J.
Chalmers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

98

Brillat-Savarin, Jean-Anthelme. The Physiology of Taste; or Meditations on
Transcendental Gastronomy. Translated by M.F.K. Fischer. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1971.
Brochet, Frédéric. “Chemical Object Representation in the Field of Consciousness.
Application Presented for the Grand Prix of the Académie Amorim Following Work
Carried out towards a Doctorate from the Faculty of Oenology, General Oenology
Laboratory, 351 Cours de La Libération, 33405 Talence Cedex.,” 2001.
Chappell, Richard Yetter. “Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive.” Philosophical
Quarterly 62, no. 249 (2012): 684–704.
Crawford, Donald W. “Reason-Giving in Kant’s Aesthetics.” The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 28, no. 4 (July 1, 1970): 505–10. doi:10.2307/428490.
Davidson, Donald. Truth, Language, and History. 1 edition. Oxford : New York:
Clarendon Press, 2005.
Dennett, Daniel. “Quining Qualia.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Erickson, Robert P. “A Study of the Science of Taste: On the Origins and Influence of the
Core Ideas.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31, no. 1 (February 2008): 59–75;
discussion 75–105. doi:10.1017/S0140525X08003348.
Erickson, R. P. “Studies on the Perception of Taste: Do Primaries Exist?” Physiology &
Behavior 28, no. 1 (January 1982): 57–62.
Halpern, Bruce P. “Taste.” In Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology, 3rd ed.
Vol. 1: Sensation and Perception. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0471214426.pas0116/abstract.

99

Hänig, David P. “Zur Psychophysik Des Geschmackssinnes.” Philosophische Studien 17
(1901): 576–623.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H.
Nidditch. 2d ed. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press,
1978.
———. “A Treatise of Human Nature.” In The Longman Standard History of Modern
Philosophy, edited by Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thomson, 1st edition. New York:
Pearson Longman, 2006.
———. “Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” In The Longman Standard
History of Modern Philosophy, edited by Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thomson, 1
edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Edited by Nicholas Walker. Translated by James
Creed Meredith. Revised edition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press,
2009.
———. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Normal Kemp Smith. Revised Second.
Boston, MA: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007.
———. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals With On a Supposed Right to Lie
because of Philanthropic Concerns. Third Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1993.
Korsmeyer, Carolyn. Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy. 1 edition. Cornell
University Press, 2014.
Kosmeyer, Carolyn. “Ethical Gourmandism.” In The Philosophy of Food, edited by
David M. Kaplan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

100

Locke, John. “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.” In The Longman Standard
History of Modern Philosophy, edited by Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thomson, 1
edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006.
McDowell, John. “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World.” In Mind,
Value, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
———. “Might There Be External Reasons?” In Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
———. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
———. “VIRTUE AND REASON.” The Monist 62, no. 3 (1979): 331–50.
Miller, I. J., and F. E. Reedy. “Variations in Human Taste Bud Density and Taste
Intensity Perception.” Physiology & Behavior 47, no. 6 (June 1990): 1213–19.
Moore, George Edward. Principia Ethica. 2nd Ed. Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of
Canada, LTD., 1922.
Morrot, G., F. Brochet, and D. Dubourdieu. “The Color of Odors.” Brain and Language
79, no. 2 (November 2001): 309–20. doi:10.1006/brln.2001.2493.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Platts, Mark. Moral Realities: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. 1st ed. New York:
Routledge, 1991.
———. “Moral Reality and the End of Desire.” In Reference, Truth, and Reality, edited
by Mark Platts, 1st Ed. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

101

———. Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language. 1st ed. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.
Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Raz, Joseph. “Introduction.” In Practical Reasoning, edited by Joseph Raz. Oxford
Readings in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Rolls, Edmund T. “The Functions of the Orbitofrontal Cortex.” Brain and Cognition 55,
no. 1 (June 2004): 11–29. doi:10.1016/S0278-2626(03)00277-X.
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2000.
Scanlon, T. M. “The Unity of the Normative.” Philosophical Studies 154, no. 3 (2011):
443–50.
Searle, John R. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. 1st ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Spinoza, Baruch. “Ethics.” In The Longman Standard History of Modern Philosophy,
edited by Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thomson, 1 edition. New York: Pearson
Longman, 2006.
Sweeny, Kevin W. “Hunger Is the Best Sauce: The Aesthetics of Food.” In The
Philosophy of Food, edited by David M. Kaplan. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2012.
Telfer, Elizabeth. Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food. London ; New York:
Routledge, 1996.
Thurber, James. The Thurber Carnival. New York: Modern Library, 1957.

102

Williams, Bernard. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Harmonsworth: Penguin,
1978.
———. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1985.
Williams, David. “A Cheeky Little Wine Column.” The Guardian, February 21, 2016,
sec. Life and style. http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/feb/21/a-cheekylittle-wine-column.
Zemach, Eddy M. Real Beauty. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997.

103

